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I. FOREWORD

This Comment addresses what has been and continues to be a very
controversial area of the law-damage caps imposed on plaintiffs who
bring medical malpractice claims against health care providers in
California. Since 1975, the state has restricted these actions as a means of
holding down liability insurance premiums and reducing litigation through
a package of statutes called the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act
(MICRA). 1 In 1991, the legislature extended these limitations to claims
brought under the state's Elder Abuse Act2 while at the same time
providing for enhanced remedies in such actions to encourage litigation. 3
Today, upon showing clear and convincing evidence4 of actionable
abuse under the statute, plaintiffs may recover attorneys' fees, as well as
pain and suffering damages not to exceed $250,000. 5 This Comment
will evaluate the specific application of MICRA within the elder abuse
context. Although it is necessary to examine the rationale underlying
MICRA, the author wishes to leave the call for overall reform of
MICRA, a proposition that has been described as equivalent to a "holy
war, " 6 to another day and another forum.
1.
MICRA was passed by the California Legislature in response to the medical
malpractice insurance crisis of the mid-1970s. Medical Injury Compensation Reform
Act, ch. 1, 1975 Cal. Stat. 3949 (codified as amended in scattered sections of CAL. Bus.
& PROF. CODE, CAL. Civ. CODE, CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE, CAL. INS. CODE); see also Tom
Dresslar, Law to Lift Cap on Malpractice Claims Unveiled: Insurers Could React by
Hiking Rates, Spurring a Prop. 103 Showdown, L.A. DAILY J., May 11, 1999, at 1
(describing the crisis that led to MICRA's passage). For a discussion of MICRA and its
implications, see infra notes 81, 158-84 and accompanying text.
2. See generally CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE§§ 15600-15660 (West 2001). The
full title of this Act is the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act.
3. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE§ 15600(h), G) (West 2001).
4. Clear and convincing evidence is defined as: "Evidence indicating that the
thing to be proved is highly probable or reasonably certain." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
577 (7th ed. 1999); see also Mock v. Mich. Millers Mut. Ins. Co., 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 594,
610 (Ct. App. 1992) (defining the standard as requiring a finding of "high probability").
5. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE§ 15657-15657(b) (West 2001); CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 3333.2(b) (West 1997).
6. Tom Dresslar, Plaintiffs' Bar ls Hoping to Doff MICRA Caps, L.A. DAILY J.,
Feb. 25, 1999, at 1 (quoting Fred J. Hiestand, special adviser to former Governor Jerry
Brown, on the issue of raising MICRA caps in 1999).
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II. INTRODUCTION
Much has been written in the past few years about the changing face,
or the graying, of America.7 Perhaps this is because baby boomers8 are
fast approaching their silver years, and this country, as a whole, has
never experienced such a radical change in its population.9 Trend
watchers and others predict the aging boomers will create dramatic
changes in the ways companies do business, influence how and when
individuals retire, and strain an already fatigued health care system
beyond limits. 10
It is said that one can determine how advanced a civilization is by the
manner in which it treats its citizens, particularly its elderly. No doubt
our own civilization will be put to the test in the coming years as a
greater percentage of the population ages. Yet, to be judged by such a
standard surely requires the capability of measuring for one's self where
one stands. For the past fifteen years, that is precisely what federal and
state governments have attempted to do. Since 1987, both have taken
aim at one of the most important problems to ever face the elderly:
institutional elder abuse. 11 Despite their efforts and those of ombudsmen12
1. See Russell V. Gerbman, Elder Care Takes America by Stonn, HR MAG., May
2000, at 51; The Observer: Aging Into the 21st Century, J. FIN. PLAN., Aug. 2000, at 25,
26. Americans aged sixty-five and older represent a rapidly increasing percentage of the
total U.S. population. See generally infra notes 33-45 and accompanying text.
8. The term "baby boomers" is a popular term that refers to a generation of adults
born between 1946 and 1964. Currently, there are approximately seventy-six million
baby boomers in the U.S., the first of whom will be able to collect full Social Security at
age sixty-six in the year 2016. Besides being a formidable force in numbers, "boomers"
are very active politically; approximately fifty-three percent of them voted in the 2000
Presidential election. Lorrie Cohen, Boomer Advocate Brings Warning, TuCSON
CITIZEN, Dec. 4, 2000, at lC, 2000 WL 27445048.
9. Karla B. Hignite, Aging Gracefully, Ass'N MGMT., Aug. 1, 2000, at 86, 2000
WL 13755701 (discussing implications on the American workforce and the need for
flexibility in retaining and recruitment of older persons); Gene Koretz, Economic
Trends: A Health-Cost Time Bomb?, Bus. WK., Aug. 7, 2000, at 26 (suggesting that
Americans look to other countries with large elderly populations to address its future
health care needs for the elderly); Gerald A. Mischke & Conrad S. Ciccotello, LongTenn Care Trends and Demographics: Implications for Financial Planning, J. FIN.
SERVICE PROFESSIONALS, Sept. 2000, at 54, 59 ("With the increasing absolute and
relative number of elderly, particularly the very old, long-term care needs and
expenditures will continue to grow faster than all health care needs and expenditures.").
IO. See sources cited supra note 9.
11. Lesley Ann Clement, A Call to Action: Nursing Home Litigation, in ATLA
ANNuAL CONVENTION REFERENCE MATERIALS (2001), available at WL Winter 2001
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charged with investigating nursing home complaints, elder abuse in
institutional settings continues at alarming rates. 13
Consider that every nineteen seconds, an elderly person becomes a
victim of abuse in the United States. 14 Nearly one in twenty elders
experience abuse, with the total number increasing annually by
500,000. 15 Worse yet, seven out of every eight instances of abuse are
never reported. 16 In Florida, the state with the highest percentage of
elderly persons, 17 complaints of nursing home abuse made to the
state's Agency for Health Care Administration can take up to seven
months before they are investigated. 18 In the state of Washington,
approximately forty percent of nursing facilities report some form of
ATLA-CLE 377; Michael Higgins, Getting Sued by Seniors, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1998, at 28.
12. State ombudsmen have been utilized since the Nixon era. They are charged
with monitoring care provided in nursing homes and they serve as a liaison between
patients, the nursing homes, and the federal and state agencies who oversee nursing
home regulations. Nina Santo, Comment, Breaking the Silence: Strategies for
Combating Elder Abuse in California, 31 MCGEORGEL. REV. 801,810 (2000).
13.
See infra notes 14-23, 137-43, 249-51 and accompanying text.
14. Elder-Abuse Prevention Seminar Set, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Jan. 14, 2000,
atB3.
15. Elder Abuse: What Can Be Done?: Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on
Human Services of the Select Comm. on Aging, 102d Cong. 6 (1991) (statement of Rep.
Wayne Owens).
16. Id. at 7. It is commonly thought that elder abuse goes unreported "because
victims often are ashamed or afraid." Yvette Craig, Agency's Site Aimed at Abuse of
Elderly: Notforgotten.org ls Part of Awareness Campaign, FORT WORTH STARTELEGRAM, Jan. 10, 2001, at IB, available at 2001 WL 5137659 (quoting Marleigh
Meisner, a regional spokesperson for the Adult Protective Services Agency).
17. According to data from the 2000 U.S. Census, 17.6% of Florida's population
of 15,982,378 was aged sixty-five or older, which was the highest percentage among the
states. U.S. Census 2000, Population and Ranking Tables of the Older Population,
http://www.census.gov/population/www/cen2000/phc-tl3.html.
18. Peggy Rogers, Nursing Home Neglect: Dangerous Delays in Oversight, MIAMI
HERALD, Dec. 20, 1998, at IL, available at http://www.herald.com/content/archive/
specialreport/docs/062414.htm. Often, any delay between the time the complaint is first
filed until it is investigated only serves to benefit the nursing home. By the time
investigators arrive, there is little more than a paper trail that may be incomplete or
unreliable. Patients may have difficulty recalling events. Nurses and other staff may
have changed employers. Documents may be falsified or incomplete. See id. Despite
delays of seven months and a growing elder abuse problem, Florida Governor Jeb Bush
recently proposed cutting the state's nursing home inspection budget. Lindsay Peterson,
Florida Officials May Revamp Nursing Home Lawsuit Capabilities, KNIGHT-RIDDER
TRIB. Bus. NEWS, Feb. 27, 2001, 2001 WL 15013660. The announcement prompted
U.S. Rep. Robert Wexler, D-Boca Raton, to release a Congressional study showing that
thirty out of thirty-seven homes in Wexler's district suffered serious federal safety
violations. Scott Hiaasen, Study: Nursing Homes Marred by Hazards, PALM BEACH
POST, Feb. 2, 2001, at 4A, 2001 WL 6821247.
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mistreatment of elderly patients, with physical abuse being the most
prevalent. 19
Although California has one of the most proactive elder abuse statutes
in force, allowing for both criminal and civil remedies,20 nearly one in
five nursing homes in the Los Angeles area have been cited for causing
actual harm to residents or for having placed them at risk of death or
serious injury. 21 Even more disturbing, a recent General Accounting
Office report concluded that only two percent of facilities statewide were
in substantial compliance with federal requirements.22 Such records of
abuse remain all too common across the country.23
Unlike the federal statutes, California's law, known as the Elder
Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act (EADACPA or the
"Elder Abuse Act"), provides civil plaintiffs a private right of action to
recover enhanced remedies24 in cases where they can show clear and
convincing evidence of physical abuse, reckless neglect, or fiduciary
abuse.25 Even though the purpose behind EADACPA's enhanced
remedies is to encourage private lawsuits,26 many attorneys still hesitate
19. Kelli J. Dilks, Mistreatment of the Elderly in Long-Tenn Care Facilities in
Washington State (1996) (unpublished M.S. thesis, Gonzaga University) (on file with the
Gonzaga University Library).
20. See George S. Ingalls et al., Elder Abuse Originating in the Institutional
Setting, 74 N.D. L. REv. 313, 323-29 (1998).
21. Hilary E. MacGregor, Nursing Home Crackdown to Begin, L.A. TlMES, Mar.
28, 2000, at A19.
22. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CALIFORNIA NURSING HOMES: FEDERAL AND STATE
OVERSIGHT INADEQUATE TO PROTECT REsIDENTS IN HOMES WITH SERIOUS CARE
VIOLATIONS 5 (1998) (statement of William J. Scanlon, Director, Health Financing and
Systems Issues, Health, Education, and Human Services Division).
23. See discussion and sources cited supra notes 14-22; infra notes 137-43, 24951 and accompanying text. Forty percent of the nation's nursing homes previously cited
for serious deficiencies continue to violate federal standards, placing patients at a risk of
death or serious injury. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NURSING HOME CARE: ENHANCED
HCFA OVERSIGHT OF STATE PROGRAMS WOULD BETIER ENSURE QUALITY 1 (1999).
24. These enhanced remedies include the following two unique applications: (1)
attorneys' fees, and (2) pain and suffering damages up to a maximum of $250,000. CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE§ 15657(a), (b) (West 2001); CAL. CIV. CODE§ 3333.2(b) (West
1997).
25. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 15657. For a review of other states' statutes
providing for civil remedies, see Ingalls et al., supra note 20, at 323-40. For a definition
of physical abuse, neglect, and fiduciary abuse, see infra notes 109-11.
26. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE§ 15600G); Delaney v. Baker, 971 P.2d 986, 992
(Cal. 1999); Russ Balisok, More Damages and Deterrence Through the Elder Abuse Act,
CAL. LmG., Vol. 13, No. 2, 2000, at 39, 39.
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to bring cases. 27 When they do, they often pad complaints with claims
of unfair business practices, false claims, emotional distress, breach of
contract and fiduciary duties, and other theories primarily to get
damages to an acceptable level. 28 If deterrence and compensation of
victims are said to be the goals of California's EADACPA, 29 then it has
failed and should be re-examined. 30
This Comment critiques developments in the last ten years since the
amendments to EADACPA allowing for enhanced remedies. As currently
provided, California's Elder Abuse Act is deficient. Enforcing criminal
27. Marion Webb, Cap on Malpractice Awards Under the Microscope, SAN DIEGO
Bus. J., Feb. 12, 2001, at 13; see also Russell S. Balisok, Medical Malpractice Actions
for the Elderly Go Ballistic While the Plaintiff's Bar Bemoans MICRA, CTLA FORUM,
Jan./Feb. 1994, at 23, 23. Because many elderly patients are not employed, already
suffer debilitating illnesses, and have lower life expectancies than most malpractice
litigants, plaintiffs' attorneys often find it difficult to justify taking cases with low
recoveries. For example, Florida recently sought to cap damage awards like California,
but at a level of $350,000. Sanjay Bhatt, Nursing Homes Want Suit Limits, PALM BEACH
POST, Mar. 3, 2000, at IA, available at 2000 WL 15276116. Advocates for elderly
patients argued that a cap would sound "the death knell" for suits against nursing homes
as "[v]ery, very few of the tragedies in a nursing home could ever result in any
compensation for family members." Id. (quoting Gregory Barnhart, a West Palm Beach
trial attorney, and Philip DeBerard, an attorney who has represented the elderly in over
forty nursing home cases). Meanwhile, proponents of the cap argued that Florida's
average cost of insuring a nursing home bed is $6200, eight times the U.S. average.
Nursing Homes in Struggle over Lawsuits, AUGUSTA CHRON., April 23, 2000, at A22,
2000 WL 20064250. Interestingly, the average lawsuit settlement in Florida is $278,000,
less than the cap would have imposed on jury awards, but more than twice the national
average. Id. California's average appears to be even lower than national figures. See
infra note 255 and accompanying text. As the Florida Legislature adjourned session, the
task force charged with reform had made no formal recommendations. It is expected,
however, that the pressure to reach consensus will resurface. Roselyn Bonanti, State
Legislation: Nursing Home Legislation, ATLA ADVOCATE, Feb. 2001, at 1, 2. Further
tort reforms are also expected in states like California and Arkansas this coming year.
Id.
28. See George Clyde Gray, Nursing Home Falls: Not Your Average Slip-and-Fall
Case, TRIAL, July 2000, at 91, 92-94 (suggesting that attorneys consider these additional
claims to successfully prosecute an elder abuse claim).
29. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE§ 15600(a), (i), (j); Delaney, 971 P.2d at 992, 994.
30. Despite EADACPA's civil remedies, nursing home abuse abounds in
California. For specific instances, see Cheryl Clark, State Officials Say Nursing Home
Provided Poor Care, SAN DIEGO UNION-Turn., Dec. 12, 2000, at B 1 (reporting that state
inspectors were "horrified" by more than 127 instances of abuse at one San Diego
facility, prompting a 167-page report and fines of $3000 per day); Tracy Wilson, Suit
Accuses Care Home of Fraud, Abuse, L.A. TIMES (Ventura County), Nov. 18, 2000, at
BI (reporting on a seventy-seven-year-old patient who lost forty pounds and developed
severe bedsores during a three-month stay); see generally GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
CALIFORNIA NURSING HOMES: CARE PROBLEMS PERSIST DESPITE FEDERAL AND STATE
OVERSIGHT (1998).
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penalties is difficult when inspections cannot be performed in a timely
manner. 31 Providing incentives for civil litigation is admirable;
however, when the burden of proof is raised so high as not to deter
wrongful conduct but rather to complicate the bringing of meritorious
elder abuse actions, such priorities must be evaluated with scrutiny.
This Comment also examines alternatives to the current regulatory
scheme by evaluating the public policies behind California's caps on
medical malpractice actions 32 and those of EADACPA. Despite
considerable grandstanding by industry advocates, reform is possible
within this context and long overdue.
A. The Coming Years: A Rapidly Increasing
Elderly Population

Currently, there are more than 34.9 million Americans aged sixty-five
or older. 33 They comprise nearly thirteen percent of the total U.S.
population.34 Within the next thirty years, it is estimated this group will
double in number to around seventy million.35 Driven mainly by baby
boomers entering their silver years, the load on our elder care system is
projected to "hit critical mass in 11 years." 36 This is when baby boomers
31. See GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 23. Often, by the time inspectors
arrive at a facility, the only information available to them is on paper. See supra note 18
regarding the inherent problems associated with such investigations. However difficult,
such investigations sometimes do yield criminal prosecutions. Recently, two nursing
home companies were indicted on four counts of involuntary manslaughter in Ohio. Two
Companies Indicted in Nursing Home Deaths, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2001 at A28,
available at 2001 WL 13954320.
32. California law limits the amount of noneconomic damages a plaintiff may
recover in medical malpractice actions to $250,000. CAL. ClV. CODE§ 3333.2 (West
1997). Generally, damages include (1) economic losses, which include medical
expenses, lost wages, and other direct losses incurred as a consequence of the injury; (2)
noneconomic injuries, that is, "pain and suffering"; and (3) punitive damages, which are
awarded when a defendant's wrongdoing is found to be intentional, malicious, or
outrageous, in disregard for the plaintiff's well-being. HEALTH PROGRAM OFFICE OF
TECHNOLOGY AsSESSMENT, IMPACT OF LEGAL REFORMS ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
COSTS 12 (1993) [hereinafter OTA].
33. U.S. Census 2000, Population and Ranking Tables of the Older Population,
http://www.census.gov/population/www/cen2000/phc-tl 3.html.
34. U.S. Census Bureau, Population 65 Years and Over and 85 Years and Over,
Region, and State: /998, http://www.census.gov/population/estimates/ state/st98elderly.txt.
35. Hignite, supra note 9, at 86.
36. Gerbman, supra note 7, at 51. Many have suggested that demand for health care
and other services will simply exceed supply. See Mischke & Ciccotello, supra note 9.

605

begin turning sixty-five, and one in five Americans will be aged sixtyfive or older. 37
A little more than ten percent of the country's elderly population,
nearly 3.6 million, live in California. 38 This state has the highest
number of elderly citizens, 39 and by 2020, its elderly ranks are also
forecasted to double. 4 Florida has the second highest concentration
of elderly Americans, with a little more than 2.8 million. 41
Nationally, only seven other states have elderly populations
exceeding one million. 42

°

B. Are Nursing Homes Viable Alternatives?

"All my life, I have feared being neglected in a nursing home,
and now I know what it is like .... I don't want anyone else to
suffer like this."43
"If the tragedies occurring in American nursing homes were
happening in our day care centers, there would be immediate
and appropriate outrage."44

While few cherish the thought of having to institutionalize a parent or
other elder relative, the new and greater strains created by a growing
elderly population suggest there may be more need in the future to rely
37. Aging into the 21st Century, J. FIN. PLAN., Aug. 2000, at 26. However, the
population aged eighty-five and older is the fastest growing segment of the elderly. Less
than two percent of the U.S. population currently belongs to this group. By 2050, five
percent of the U.S. population will be aged eighty-five or older. Id.
38. U.S. Census 2000, Population and Ranking Tables of the Older Population,
http://www.census.gov/population/www/cen2000/phc-t13.htm1.
39. Id. California leads Florida by approximately 800,000 elderly residents. Id.
40. Derek J. Moore, In Demand as More Baby Boomers Edge Past Age 50, The
Council on Aging ls Facing a Growing Need for Its Services, PRESS DEMOCRAT (Santa
Rosa, Cal.), Dec. 29, 2000, at 6, 2000 WL 24344360.
41. U.S. Census 2000, Population and Ranking Tables of the Older Population,
http://www.census.gov/population/www/cen2000/phc-t13.html.
42. These states include Illinois with 1,500,025; Michigan with 1,219,018; New
Jersey with 1,113,136; New York with 2,448,352; Ohio with 1,507,757; Pennsylvania
with 1,919,165; and Texas with 2,072,532. California and Florida have 3,595,658 and
2,807,597, respectively. Id.
43. Jonathan Riskind & Lee Leonard, State Might Narrow Scope of Nursing-Home
Abuse Suits, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Mar. 5, 2002, at lA, 2002 WL 13974733 (quoting
Helen Love, who suffered abuse in a nursing home in California).
44. Christine V. Williams, Comment, The Nursing Home Dilemma in America
Today: The Suffering Must Be Recognized and Eradicated, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REv.
867, 873 (2001) (quoting Tim Fuller, Executive Director of the Gray Panthers).
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on such care.4s Of course, most seniors fear entering a nursing home,
equating it to a "death sentence."46 Others need nursing care but simply
cannot afford it without depleting their assets to qualify for Medicaid.47
Such choices force not only a change in the quality of care available, but
often result in lower self-esteem of seniors, bringing on additional
complications such as depression.48
More and more, family members who care for elder relatives at home
confront an additional dilemma. It is estimated that employees who
provide eight or more hours of care weekly to their relatives forego more
than $650,000 in wages.49 While few argue such an economic sacrifice
should determine the resort to institutional care, the truth is that for
many individuals with careers and other family commitments, the only
choice for elder care is one between institutions.so
Moreover, with increasing life expectancies comes yet another
demand on our ability to care for the elderly.s 1 On average, individuals
who reach sixty-five years of age can expect to live another 17.6 years,
according to the American Association of Retired Persons.s2 Many of
these will eventually need some form of long-term care,s3 such as
45. Gray, supra note 28, at 91.
46. Mischke & Ciccotello, supra note 9, at 55. "As people get older, they want to
remain independent in their home." Craig, supra note 16, at 1B (quoting Kathleen
Holzaepfel, a case management coordinator for United Way).
47. Mischke & Ciccotello, supra note 9, at 55. Many elderly find themselves "too
wealthy'' to be considered for open beds, which are typically funded by Medicaid. See id.
48. Loss of independence is a factor that contributes to depression in the elderly
entering nursing homes. See Craig, supra note 16, at 1B (recognizing that the elderly
generally want to stay in their own homes); Mischke & Ciccotello, supra note 9, at 55
("Elders tend to remain healthier and to enjoy life more fully when they can stay in their
own homes with the help of home health care.").
49. Gerbman, supra note 7, at 56. The study was conducted by the National
Center for Women and Aging at Brandeis University and the National Alliance for
Caregivers. Id. The loss in income and productivity occurs when "[w]orkers often alter
their work schedules-come in late, leave early, take long lunches; make or receive
phone calls at work related to their caregiving responsibilities; miss work to take their
relatives to appointments or to deal with sudden crises." The Metlife Study of Employer
Costs for Working Caregivers, NAT'L AcAD. OF ELDER L. ATTY'S SYMP., 2000, WL
2000 NAELAS 4-2 [herinafter Metlife Study].
50. See Metlife Study, supra note 49. For many Americans who must work to
make a living, providing care to an older relative can be problematic, leaving them with
very little choice but to seek institutional care.
51. Gerbman, supra note 7, at 54.
52.
Id.
53. Id.
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traditional nursing home care, community-based care, or home care. 54
Notwithstanding these options, nursing homes are the only option for
many Americans. 55
C. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act

In 1987, Congress enacted the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
(OBRA) that regulates the care of elder and dependent adults in nursing
homes that receive Medicare payments. 56 The statutes were enacted
after twenty years of adverse publicity, litigation, and Congressional
hearings surrounding the quality of care in the nation's nursing homes. 57
Today, the Act's purpose is to ensure that all federally funded
nursing homes operate in substantial compliance with federal
standards, that is, it sets a minimal standard of care. 58 Some critics
54. See Mischke & Ciccotello, supra note 9, at 54. Nursing home care grew
rapidly until the mid-1980s. Id. at 55. Today, however, the increase in the nursing home
population is outpaced by the growth in the elder population. Id. Approximately onehalf million Americans utilize hospice care, which provides for the physical and
emotional needs of terminally ill patients. Id. at 54. Another eight million Americans
receive some form of health care at home while an unknown number rely on other forms
of noninstitutional care, such as home health care, home hospice, adult day care, and
respite care. Id.
55. Currently, approximately 1.6 million people live in the country's 17,000
nursing homes. Robert Pear, Congressional Investigators Cite Safety Violations at
Nursing Homes, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2000, at A24. In California, more than 100,000
elderly patients reside in nursing homes. Ca[l]. High Court to Decide Jurisdiction for
Elder Abuse Cases: Mueller v. St. Jospeh [sic] Medical Center, ANDREWS HEALTH L.
LITIG. REP., Feb. 1998, at 6, WL 5 No. 7 ANHLLR 6. The average cost of care per day
in a nursing home is $153. Cohen, supra note 8. Types of nursing homes include skilled
nursing facilities, known throughout the industry as SNFs, and Residential Care
Facilities for the Elderly (RCFEs). SNFs generally provide the skilled services required
by Medicare, while RCFEs provide little more than housing and meals. RCFEs may
store medication and provide Alzheimer's treatments and other minor health care
services, but are not considered health care providers. Thus, it is a given that plaintiffs
who bring actions against RCFEs are not in any way limited by MICRA. Gary N. Stem,
MICRA 's Scope, L.A. DAILY J., May 12, 2000, at Verdicts & Settlements 5 (discussing
Kotler v. Alma Lodge, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 721 (Ct. App. 1998) (holding that RCFEs are not
health care providers; thus, MICRA does not apply)); Greg Mitchell, Court Defines the
Limitations of MICRA Caps: Damage Limits Don't Apply to Residential Facilities,
RECORDER (San Francisco), May 20, 1998, at I, WL 5/20/1998 RECORDER-SF I.
56. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101 Stat.
1330 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); Ingalls et al., supra note
20, at 313-19.
57. Angela S. Quinn, Comment, Imposing Federal Criminal Liability on Nursing
Homes: A Way of Deterring Inadequate Health Care and Improving the Quality of Care
Delivered?, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 653, 662-66 (1999).
58. See Terri D. Keville et al., Recent Developments in Long-Term Care Law and
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say OBRA is so broad that it governs practically every component of
care found in nursing facilities, 59 making the industry one of the most
closely regulated in the United States. 60
In particular, the Nursing Home Reform amendments found within
OBRA represent the "most comprehensive nursing home law passed
by Congress since the enactment of Medicare and Medicaid." 61 The
legislation includes (1) requirements that homes must meet to
participate in both programs; (2) survey and certification procedures;
and (3) enforcement, including intermediate sanctions. 62 As evidence
of its breadth, the requirements, which became effective October 1,
1990, took nearly two and one-half years to implement. 63
However, despite the increased emphasis on preventing nursing
home abuse, 64 instances of abuse have continued to escalate in these
facilities. 65 Fault, however, does not fall squarely on the federal
government. OBRA requires joint federal and state oversight of
nursing facilities to combat abuse and neglect. 66 While many states
attempt to control the problem through on-site investigations, they
simply cannot keep pace with the more than 100,000 complaints
generated each year.67 Still others are too lenient in their investigations.68
Litigation, 20 WHITTIER L. REv. 325, 332 (1998), available at WL 20 WTLR 325 ("The
concept of 'substantial compliance,' found in the plain language of the regulatory
scheme, indicates that some level of imperfection is tolerated .... rather than perfect
compliance with these requirements."); Michael Jonathan Grinfeld, Nursing Homes
Persist as Gerontology's Greatest Challenge, GERIA1RIC TIMEs, May/June 2000,
http:l/www.medinfosource.com/gt/g0006l2.html.
59. See Quinn, supra note 57, at 659-60 (explaining that the statute requires
written care plans and annual assessments of residents, provides residents with a bill of
rights, and addresses training requirements for staff, among other conditions).
60. Charles A. Deacon, In the Cross Hairs: Plaintiffs Lawyers Take Aim at
Nursing Home Owners, TEx. LAWYER, April 3, 2000, at 29 ("[It] is the second heaviest
regulated industry in the nation.").
61. STAFF OF SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, 102D CONG., AN ADVOCATE'S
GUIDE TO LAWS AND PROGRAMS ADDRESSING ELDER ABUSE 24 (Comm. Print 1991).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See supra notes 56-63 and accompanying text.
65. See supra notes 14-23; infra notes 136--43, 249-51 and accompanying text.
66. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 23, at 2-5.
67. See GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NURSING HOMES: COMPLAINT lNvESTIGATION
PROCESSES OFTEN INADEQUATE TO PROTECT RESIDENTS 2 (1999) (describing numerous
problems in fourteen states surveyed, including "procedures or practices that may limit
the filing of complaints, understatement of the seriousness of complaints, and failure to
investigate serious complaints promptly''); Quinn, supra note 57, at 664-65 (reporting
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Part of the continuing problem is that OBRA, in itself, provides for no
private right of action, and only a handful of states have enacted such
laws. 69 Hence, huge differences in the application and substance of
these laws arise, as expected.70 Without any federal civil remedy or
effective state model to follow, many states continue to be ill prepared to
deal with nursing home abuse.

D. California's Response: The Elderly and Dependent
Adult Care Protection Act
"It will no longer be cheaper to kill an old person than to
injure one."71

In 1991, the California Legislature declared the elderly a "disadvantaged
class" in need of particular protection and amended EADACPA to
combat elder abuse in the state. 72 In October of that year, Governor Pete
Wilson signed the Elder Abuse Act, which became effective January 1,
1992.73 At the time, it was hailed as having substantially more impact
that more than 144,000 complaints were lodged against nursing homes in 1996); Joe
Calderone & Thomas Zambito, Major Reforms Are Needed Now: Experts Offer Cure for
Abuses, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Dec. 19, 2000, at 28, 2000 WL 29596644 (noting a
traditional lack of staffing, lack of criminal background checks for staff, and an
inadequate number of state inspectors to battle elder abuse in New York nursing homes);
Craig, supra note 16 at IB; Rogers, supra note 18, at IL. "The number of nursing
homes nationwide cited for abuse is estimated to have increased by up to 20 percent
from 1999 to 2000, according to the U.S. Senate Committee on Aging." Riskind &
Leonard, supra note 43, at IA.
68. Access/Quality/Cost: Nursing Homes: Federal Inspectors Step Up Investigations,
AM. POL. NE1WORK AM. HEALTII LINE, Nov. 16, 2000, at 16, 16, WL 11/16/2000 APNHE 16. One such investigation in Colorado prompted a forty-two-page audit citing the
state's agency that oversees the inspections as being "incomplete and overly lenient." Id.
Federal authorities also found investigations delayed by up to eight months in other
states, including Maryland and Michigan. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 67, at
14-15.
69. Some of these include Louisiana, Maryland, Oregon, and Massachusetts.
Ingalls et al., supra note 20, at 326-37.
70. See id. for a discussion of the various states' laws. In lieu of more recent
reports of abuse, some legislators are calling for federal legislation "standardizing the
definition of abuse, toughening reporting requirements and creating a nationwide registry
and criminal background-check system for nursing home employees ...." Joan
McKinney, La. Nursing Home Laws Leave Some Gaps on Abuse, BATON ROUGE
ADVOCATE, Mar. 5, 2002, at 9A, 2002 WL 5027726.
71. Marc Hankin, The Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act,
BEVERLY HILLS B. Ass'N J., Winter 1992, at 18, 19.
72. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §15600(h) (West 2001).
73. Hankin, supra note 71, at 18.
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on the quality of life for elders than any other civil rights legislation
passed in recent years.74 Today, it is still considered by some to be
revolutionary despite the dismal reports of increasing abuse in the state.75
Unlike existing limits on medical malpractice actions, the new statute
provided for enhanced remedies in an effort to encourage plaintiffs'
attorneys to bring suits.76 While some attorneys argued that elder abuse
cases often involved "the most sympathetic and wholesome plaintiffs,"77
perhaps suggesting there was little need for an incentive, many others saw
elderly clients as frail and unattractive, especially with respect to damages.78
To create an incentive, the legislature permitted plaintiffs to recover
attorneys' fees and pain and suffering damages. 79 However, the
legislature also preserved MICRA80 caps, which preceded the
EADACPA amendments by more than fifteen years. The caps were to
remain in place for all claims arising from "professional negligence,"
which alleviated concerns of the insurance and nursing home lobbies of
potential runaway malpractice insurance costs. 81
14. Id.
15. See supra notes 14-23, infra notes 136-43, 249-51 and accompanying text.
76. See Balisok, supra note 26, at 39; see also Michael Jonathan Grinfeld, Dying
to Sue, CAL. LAW., Feb. 2000, at 41, 42.
77. Balisok, supra note 27, at 24; see also Grinfeld, supra note 76, at 42 (quoting
an attorney as saying: "Wrongful death actions for the elderly are often not filed because
the damages for the loss of care, comfort, and society don't seem to warrant full-scale
civil actions").
78. Balisok, supra note 27, at 24. Unlike typical malpractice victims, nursing
home patients generally cannot recover lost wages because they no longer work. See
Higgins, supra note 11, at 29; Keville et al., supra note 58, at 328. Furthermore, many
already suffer from painful and debilitating illnesses and have shorter life expectancies.
As such, recoveries are generally very low. Hankin, supra note 71, at 19.
79. Balisok, supra note 26, at 39-40.
80. The Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975, commonly known as
MICRA, actually refers to several statutes that restrict or place conditions upon
malpractice plaintiffs' causes of action and their remedies when directed at health care
providers. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE§ 364 (West 1982) (requiring a ninety day notice
before bringing a complaint for malpractice); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 667.7 (West
1987) (permitting courts discretion to order periodic, rather than lump-sum payments of
judgments against providers); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1295 (West 1982) (requiring a
certain type of notice for mandatory arbitration provisions in contracts for medical
services); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6146 (West 1990) (providing caps on attorney
contingency fees); CAL. CIV. CODE§ 3333.1 (West 1997) (making admissible evidence
of workers' compensation or disability payments); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West
1997) (providing a cap of$250,000 on noneconomic damages).
81. Delaney v. Baker, 971 P.2d 986, 992 (Cal. 1999). While it may be important
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Over the years, calls for general reform of MICRA have surfaced
repeatedly, but none have been successful. 82 While these reforms have
applied to MICRA as a whole, there has been little focus on these
reforms as they impact elder abuse claims. Such an examination, despite
claims to the contrary, does not contravene the policy behind MICRA
caps because many of the operators of nursing homes today are large
corporations rather than individual operators. 83 Nursing homes have
become big business84 with their own lobbyists. 85 The need to protect
such big corporations is considerably weaker than the need to protect the
individual practitioner from escalating malpractice premiums.86 In short,
greater liability must be imposed to achieve deterrence. Capping
damages to hold down liability insurance rates in this industry seems
counterproductive, given that many operators are self-insured87 and that
the vast majority of malpractice premiums are subsidized by Medicaid
and MediCal. 88 Indeed, the very reliance of nursing home advocates on
arguments advanced by their health care counterparts from the mid1970s seeking to justify MICRA may carry little merit.
A considerable fascination exists on the part of the federal government
and other states with California and the way it has worked to resolve its
malpractice and elder abuse challenges over the last twenty-six years.89

to control insurance costs for the general health care industry, by specifically classifying
the elderly as a disadvantaged class, the legislature suggested a different approach was
needed for the elderly.
82. See infra notes 174-76, 185-98 and accompanying text.
83. See GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NURSING HOMES: AGGREGATE MEDICARE
PAYMENTS ARE ADEQUATE DESPITE BANKRUPTCIES 3 (2000) (statement of Laura A.
Dummit, Associate Director, Health Financing and Public Health Issues, Health,
Education, and Human Services Division).
84. See id. One-half of all nursing homes in the nation are run by large chains. Id.
85. Balisok, supra note 26, at 41 ("In response to this upsurge in liability actions
against nursing homes, these industries have greatly increased their lobbying efforts in
our Legislature."); see also infra note 191.
86. See infra notes 256-59 and accompanying text.
87. For instance, Sun Healthcare Group, one of the largest operators of nursing
homes in the country, recently self-insured itself after its malpractice carrier
dropped coverage of the company. Today, Sun is insured for up to $3 million per
facility. SUN HEALTHCARE GROUP, INC., 1999 FORM 10-K 18 (2000), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/904978/000090497800000023/000904978-00000023-000 l .txt.
88. Both federal and state programs reimburse a nursing home for its liability
premiums paid to insure Medicaid and MediCal beds. Balisok, supra note 26, at 42.
89. In addition to being the focus of numerous law review articles on the topic, the
General Accounting Office has taken a special interest in California's response to elder
abuse, prompting several special reports. See generally GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
supra note 30; GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CALIFORNIA NURSING HOMES: FEDERAL AND
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Perhaps this is because California has the largest number of elderly residents
in the country.90 Or perhaps it is because California spends more
investigating complaints of elder abuse than any other state91 yet suffers
from an appalling rate of elder abuse.92 Since the EADACPA amendments
in 1991, many states, and indeed many scholars and practitioners, have
turned to the California statute to formulate new approaches and argue for
reform in other states.93 None have gone so far as to criticize, much less
truly examine, California's use of l\1ICRA in its Elder Abuse Act. 94 That
battle has been carried on by only a handful of practitioners.95

STAlE OVERSIGHT lNADEQUAlE TO PROTECT REsIDENTS IN HOMES WITH SERIOUS CARE
VIOLATIONS (1998).
90. See discussion and sources cited supra notes 38-39.
91. In fiscal year 1998, California spent $1,834,312 to investigate complaints
against nursing homes, more than any other state. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note
67, at 36.
92. See discussion and sources cited supra notes 14-23; infra notes 137-39, 141-43,
249-51 and accompanying text.
93. Some of these states have much higher caps on noneconomic damages than
does California. Tom Kertscher, Court Upholds State's Cap on Medical Damages:
Lawyers Predict More Legal Wrangling over Pain and Suffering Limits After Split
Decisions, J. SENTINEL (Milwaukee), Dec. 19, 2000, at IB, available at
http://wwwJsonline.com/news/metro/dec00/cap20121900a.asp (reporting that Wisconsin
limits pain and suffering damages to $350,000). Other states with limits include: Alaska
($400,000), ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.0lO(b) (Michie 2000); Kansas ($250,000), KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-19a01(b) (1994); Michigan ($280,000), MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
600.1483(1) (West 1996); and Texas ($500,000 total recovery, $150,000 pain and
suffering), Tux. CIV. STAT. art. 4590i, §§ 11.02(a), 11.03 (Vernon 1976 and Supp. 2002).
Arizona does not limit pain and suffering damages in any way. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN.§
12-613 (West 1992). Ohio recently raised its limit, after having earlier declared it
unconstitutional, to $1 million or $35,000 times the remaining years of the person's life.
Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2323.54(B)(2) (West 1994 and Supp. 2001); see State ex rel.
Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1095 (Ohio 1999). Nevada
is currently considering capping medical malpractice awards as malpractice rates are
increasing from $40,000 to $200,000 annually. Nevada Governor Seeks Med-Mal Cap,
LAW. WKLY. USA, Feb. 4, 2002, at 2.
94. To date, no law review articles criticizing MICRA's application to elder abuse
have been published.
95. These practitioners include Balisok, Stern and Hankin, who devote their
practices to elder abuse cases. As usual in such high profile cases, many plaintiffs'
attorneys have their viewpoints dismissed as purely self-serving for financial gain. See
Deacon, supra note 60.
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I. Recent Developments
Meanwhile, cries of help sound throughout the country to alleviate the
nation's problem with elder abuse. The Clinton Administration took a
strong interest in calling for regulators to enforce violations against
nursing homes. 96 The U.S. Health Care Financing Administration has
made available a web site where individuals and families can compare
long-term nursing facilities. 97 Appropriations have been made to
strengthen the nation's ombudsman program. 98 And, the Senate is
encouraging criminal background checks of nursing home employees. 99
Private and professional organizations are also joining in the efforts to
educate the public about elder abuse. The American Bar Association has
published books on mediating nursing home conflicts 100 and its Young
Lawyers Division has called for putting elder abuse cases on fast
tracks. 101
At the state level, investigations have increased, including in California In
March 2000, California's Attorney General announced surprise investigations
at the state's 1500 facilities. 102 Known as "Operation Guardians," the
program is to address the alarming numbers of abuse cases in the state. 103
The state cites as justification a Congressional report that found less than
three percent of the 439 nursing homes in Los Angeles County to be in

96. Higgins, supra note 11, at 29. The Bush Administration, however, appears
poised to go the other way. In early September 2001, President Bush indicated his
administration would lighten up on nursing home regulations, reducing or eliminating
penalties, reducing the frequency of site visits, and allowing nursing homes to police
themselves. Robert Pear, U.S. May Ease Rein on Nursing Homes, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7,
2001, at Al.
97. Health Care Financing Administration, Medicare: Nursing Home Compare, at
http://www.medicare.gov/NHCompare/home.asp (last visited April 7, 2001). However,
the effectiveness of the Web site was recently called into question by the House
Committee on Government Reform, which found that nearly 25,000 violations recorded
by state agencies had been excluded from the system. Brian Faler, Online Guide
Lacks Data on Nursing Homes: Study Says HHS Omits State Probers' Reports, WASH.

PosT, Feb. 21, 2002, at Al9, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A424732002Feb20.html.
98. Statement by the President, M2 PRESSWIRE, Oct. 27, 2000, 2000 WL
28278193. The reauthorization of the Older Americans Act will carry appropriations
through 2004. David Steinberg, Year 2000 Victories for Seniors, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 31,
2000, at WB7, available at 2000 WL 6501383.
99. Higgins, supra note 11, at 29.
100. Id.
101.

Id.

102. MacGregor, supra note 21, at Al 9.
103. Id. Results of this recent effort are currently unknown, as no official summary
or report has been released.
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full or substantial compliance with federal regulations. 104 Statewide,
however, only two percent of nursing homes were found without any
substantial violations. 105
A critical inquiry questions why, with all this attention, this form
of abuse continues, despite both criminal and civil penalties, and
California's record spending to investigate nursing home complaints.
One answer may be that policies to limit damage awards in professional
malpractice actions tend to hamper plaintiffs from bringing suit and
ultimately enforcing the state's Elder Abuse statute. 106 As this occurs,
any general deterrence the statute could claim is severely diminished. 101
2. Civil Remedies Provided Under EADACPA

As discussed earlier, the California Legislature amended the state's
Elder Abuse Act in 1991 to offer incentives to bring such actions by
allowing parties' recovery of attorneys' fees and pain and suffering
damages in the event of the death of the victim. 108 The current statute
provides remedies for the following three types of abuse: physical, 109
104. Id.; see also GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 30.
105. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 22, at 5.
106. Bhatt, supra note 27.
107. Empirically, federal and state sanctions alone do not work. While most
nursing homes correct deficiencies discovered by government investigations,
approximately forty percent of homes previously cited for serious deficiencies later
repeat the same violations. "The threat of sanctions appeared to have little effect on
deterring homes from falling out of compliance again because homes could continue to
avoid the sanctions' effect as long as they kept correcting their deficiencies." GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NURSING HOl\ffiS: ADDmONAL STEPS NEEDED TO STRENGTHEN
ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL QUALITY STANDARDS 3 (1999). Civil remedies, on the other
hand, may serve to hold nursing homes liable for their conduct despite such measures
aimed at avoiding penalties. Id.
108. Gary N. Stem, In the Totality: A Centralized Set of Remedies to Elder Abuse Is
Found in the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protect [sic] Act, Welfare &
Institutions Code, L.A. DAILY J., Feb. 25, 2000, at Verdicts & Settlements 5. In many
jurisdictions, pain and suffering damages are said to "die with the plaintiff' in elder
abuse and wrongful death cases. In these jurisdictions, a patient would recover more
alive than dead, even for the same injuries.
109. According to the statute, physical abuse may mean any one of the following:
assault; battery; assault with a deadly weapon or force likely to produce great bodily
injury; unreasonable physical constraint; prolonged or continual deprivation of food and
water; sexual assault; sexual battery; rape; incest; sodomy; oral copulation; anal or
genital penetration; use of either a physical or chemical restraint or psychotropic
medication for punishment, for longer than necessary, or for any purpose inconsistent
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fiduciary, 110 and neglect. 111 Upon showing clear and convincing evidence
of any one of these, plaintiffs may recover both attorneys' fees and pain
and suffering damages, with the latter being limited to $250,000. In
pertinent part, section 15657 of the California Elder Abuse and
Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act states:
Where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that a defendant is liable for
physical abuse as defined in Section 15610.63, neglect as defined in Section
15610.57, or fiduciary abuse as defined in Section 15610.30, and that the
defendant has been guilty of recklessness, oppression, fraud, or malice in the
commission of this abuse, in addition to all other remedies otherwise provided by
law:
(a) The court shall award to the plaintiff reasonable attorney's fees and costs.
The term "costs" includes, but is not limited to, reasonable fees for the
services of a conservator, if any, devoted to the litigation of a claim brought
under this article.
(b) The limitations imposed by Section 337.34 of the Code of Civil Procedure on
the damages recoverable shall not apply. However, the damages recovered
shall not exceed the damages permitted to be recovered pursuant to
subdivision (b) of Section 3333.2 of the Civil Code.
(c) The standards set forth in subdivision (b) of Section 3294 of the Civil Code
regarding the imposition of punitive damages on an employer based upon the
acts of an employee shall be satisfied before any damages or attorney's fees
permitted under this section may be imposed against an employer. 112

While the purpose of this section is to encourage private attorneys to pursue
elder abuse claims, essentially the only difference between the enhanced
remedies of EADACPA and those limited by :tv1ICRA is in the amount of
attorneys' fees recoverable. Under the Elder Abuse Act, "reasonable fees"
may be granted by the court, rather than :tv1ICRA's sliding scale of fees. 113
with that authorized by a physician. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE§ 15610.63 (West 2001).
110. Financial abuse "occurs when a person or entity. . . [t]akes, secretes,
appropriates or retains real or personal property of an elder or dependent adult to a
wrongful use or with intent to defraud, or both." Id. § 15610.30(a)(l). Assisting another
in such acts also triggers the statute. Id.§ 15610.30(a)(2).
111. Neglect can mean many things under the statute. It includes (1) failure to
assist in personal hygiene, or in the provision of food, clothing, or shelter; (2) failure to
provide medical care for physical and mental health needs; (3) failure to protect from
health and safety hazards; (4) failure to prevent malnutrition or dehydration; and (5)
failure of a person to provide the needs specified above, for themselves, due to
ignorance, illiteracy, incompetence, mental limitation, substance abuse, or poor health.
Id. § 15610.57.
112. Id.§ 15657.
113. MICRA provides:
An attorney shall not contract for or collect a contingency fee for representing any
person seeking damages in connection with an action for injury or damage against
a health care provider based upon such person's alleged professional negligence in
excess of the following limits: (1) [f]orty percent of the first fifty thousand dollars
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While both attorneys' fees and pain and suffering damages are available
upon establishing clear and convincing evidence of abuse, 114 plaintiffs
are still limited by MICRA' s cap on noneconomic damages. The key to
distinguishing an action under the Elder Abuse Act from one of
traditional negligence is simply a matter of degree, that is, the difference
between an action based in negligence and one based on reckless
conduct or intent (physical abuse and fiduciary abuse). Generally,
proving such extreme conduct, for example, is considerably more
difficult than proving simple negligence. With the addition of the clear
and convincing evidentiary standard, the statute virtually eliminates any
incentive to bring actions except in cases of truly egregious behavior.
To further underscore and complicate the scheme, section 15657.2 of
EADACPA reiterates:
Notwithstanding this article, any cause of action for injury or damage against a
health care provider, as defined in Section 340.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
based on the health care provider's alleged professional negligence, shall be
governed by those laws which specifically apply to those professional negligence
causes of action. 115

In particular, this last subsection of the statute has sparked a huge
battle between litigants and nursing homes regarding whether actions
based on professional negligence are outside the realm of enhanced
remedies altogether. Advocates of the nursing homes contend that
because 15657.2 limits actions brought for professional malpractice
to MICRA, then nursing homes who injure patients are guilty of no
more than negligence since their reckless conduct could only arise
first from negligent behavior. Such was the issue decided recently by
the California Supreme Court in Delaney v. Baker. 116

($50,000) recovered; (2) [t]hirty-three and one-third percent of the next fifty
thousand dollars ($50,000) recovered; (3) [t]wenty-five percent of the next five
hundred thousand dollars ($500,000) recovered; (4) [f]ifteen percent of any
amount on which the recovery exceeds six hundred thousand dollars ($600,000).
CAL. Bus. &PROF. CODE§ 6146(a) (West 1990).
114. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 15657. For a definition of the clear and
convincing standard, see discussion supra note 4.
115. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE§ 15657.2.
116. Delaney v. Baker, 971 P.2d 986 (Cal. 1999).
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3. Delaney v. Baker
In Delaney, the California Supreme Court considered whether a
nursing home provider could invoke restrictions on remedies against
health care providers for professional negligence in light of engaging
in reckless neglect. 117 Plaintiff, the daughter of an eighty-eight-yearold woman who fell and broke her right ankle, admitted her mother to
a skilled nursing facility because she was unable to provide the care
her mother required during that time. Less than four months after her
mother entered the facility, she died. At the time of her death, she was
found with stage III and stage IV bedsores, the most serious of which
had deteriorated down to the bone. 118 At trial, plaintiffs attorneys
introduced evidence that the mother had been left to lie in her own feces
and urine for extended periods of time. 119 As is common, there were
also numerous medical monitoring and record keeping violations
discovered at the facility. 120
The complaint alleged theories of negligence, willful misconduct, and
neglect as defined in California's Elder Abuse Act. 121 The jury found
for the plaintiff on the negligence and elder abuse (neglect) claims, 122
awarding the plaintiff $150,000 for her mom's pain and suffering,
inconvenience, physical impairment and disfigurement, and $15,000 in
medical costs and treatment. 123 Plaintiff moved for attorney's fees and
costs and was given $185,723.50 and $32,291.24, respectively. 124
At issue on appeal was whether section 15657.2 of the Act forbade
application of section 15657 in cases where plaintiffs prove clear and
convincing evidence of actionable conduct. 125 Justice Mosk, writing for the
majority, noted:
117. Id. at 988.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. In claims against nursing homes, it is common to find statements of
deficiencies noted by the Department of Health Services (DHS) that are gained through
routine inspections or as part of the complaint investigation process itself. Because of
OBRA's wide reach, it is considered to be virtually impossible to maintain perfect or full
compliance. Therefore, the standard enforced by DHS and other state agencies is one of
substantial compliance with federal guidelines. Keville et al., supra note 58, at 332-33.
121. Id. For a definition of neglect, see supra note 111.
122.
Delaney, 971 P.2d at 989.
123.
Id.
124.
Id. Interestingly, the amount of attorney's fees and costs exceeded the
plaintiff's recovery, and the defendants appealed. Both the court of appeal and the
supreme court affirmed the lower court's finding. Id. at 998.
125. Id. at 988. Actionable conduct includes physical abuse, fiduciary abuse, or
neglect, as provided in the Elder Abuse Act. See discussion and sources cited supra
notes 109-111.
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In order to obtain the remedies available in section 15657, a plaintiff must
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that defendant is guilty of
something more than negligence; he or she must show reckless, oppressive,
fraudulent, or malicious conduct. ... "Recklessness" refers to a subjective state of
culpability greater than simple negligence, which has been described as a
"deliberate disregard" of the "high degree of probability" that an injury will
occur. . . . Recklessness, unlike negligence, involves more than "inadvertence,
incompetence, unskillfulness, or a failure to take precautions" but rather rises to
the level of a "conscious choice of a course of action ... with knowledge of the
serious danger to others involved in it." 126

This distinction between negligence and recklessness, in effect, provides
two distinct sets of remedies. The first theory of recovery is based on
traditional malpractice, requiring the action to be founded upon
negligence. Cases that involve more than that-recklessness or intentwould invoke the heightened remedies prescribed by EADACPA. The
Delaney court distinguished the two EADACPA sections by holding:
"Section 15657.2 can therefore be read as making clear that the acts
proscribed by section 15657 do not include acts of simple professional
negligence, but refer to forms of abuse or neglect performed with some
state of culpability greater than mere negligence." 127 The court further
acknowledged that the nursing home industry generates complicated and
unique questions of liability:
The difficulty in distinguishing between "neglect" and "professional negligence"
lies in the fact that some health care institutions, such as nursing homes, perform
custodial functions and provide professional medical care. When, for example, a
nursing home allows a patient to suffer malnutrition, defendants appear to argue
that this was "professional negligence," the inability of nursing staff to prescribe
or execute a plan of furnishing sufficient nutrition to someone too infirm to attend
to that need herself. But such omission is also unquestionably "neglect," as that
term is defined in former section 15610.57. 128

Despite the court's analogy, the weight of this significant difference
between custodial functions and professional medical care may have
eluded true consideration. While skilled nursing facilities typically offer
medical care, many also provide custodial care. Had some of the
actionable conduct in Delaney occurred while the patient was in a
Residential Care Facility for the Elderly (RCFE), MICRA would not
have applied. Thus, a plaintiff could recover more in damages against
126.
127.
128.

Delaney, 971 P.2d. at 991 (citations omitted).
Id.
Id. at 993.
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an RCFE on a showing of negligence than against a skilled nursing
home on a showing of recklessness under EADACPA, even if the injury
and circumstances were identical. Such a disparity in remedies leads
one to question whether there is effectively any difference between the
abuse and neglect committed in nursing homes from that committed in
other settings, such as RCFEs. If not, one must consider whether such
acts are really malpractice at all and, as such, whether MICRA should
apply for certain types of conduct. 129
Two other revelations emerged from the opinion in Delaney that are
noteworthy. First, there was judicial recognition that section 15657 130
sustained policies of deterrence via private suits as well as victim
compensation. 131 This is especially important when one considers that
often state and federal sanctions have little deterrent effect on abuse. 132
The second key observation made was that many of the arguments
raised in 1991 to reject the enhanced remedies of EADACPA were

129. Indeed, such analysis does seem to be emerging in states with similar laws. In
January 2001, a Texas appellate court held a plaintiff who had been attacked and
severely injured while an inpatient at a hospital could not have her claim dismissed
against the hospital for failure to bring it according to the state's Medical Liability and
Insurance Improvement Act. Bush v. Green Oaks Operator, Inc., 39 S.W.3d 669 (Tex.
App. 2001). The court held her claim was not covered by the Act. Id. at 670, 673. The
Texas statute, similar to California's MICRA, was passed to control runaway
malpractice insurance premiums and to discourage malpractice litigation. Id. at 671.
However, in its opinion, the court noted that "we must be equally careful not to extend
the Act's reach beyond its stated bounds. Clearly, not every action taken by a health care
provider or every injury suffered by a patient falls within the ambit of the Act." Id. In
deciding what is covered by the statute and what is not, the court said, "In general, a
cause of action will be considered a health care liability claim if it is based on a breach of
a standard of care applicable to health care providers. The act or omission complained of
must also be an inseparable part of the rendition of medical services." Id. at 672. It
remains to be seen if the decision will be upheld, but meanwhile, it raises the possibility
that MICRA could also undergo such scrutiny.
130. Section 15657 was added in 1991 to encourage litigation of elder abuse claims.
See supra notes 72-82 and accompanying text.
131. Delaney, 971 P.2d at 994. Such a policy is important in light of evidence that
federal and state sanctions by themselves do not work. See discussion supra note 107.
132. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 107, at 3. When the abuse rises to the
level of criminal conduct, that is, assault or rape, "[i]t is clear that nursing home crimes
are not reported or punished with the same severity as crimes outside those nursing home
walls." Dennis Camire, Nursing Home Abuse not Treated the Same as Other Crimes,
GANNETT NEWS SERVICE, Mar. 5, 2002, 2002 WL 5256656 (quoting a U.S. Senator). "In
fact, in at least half the nursing home abuse cases ... homes took more than two days to
notify state licensing authorities. In nearly one quarter of the cases, it took longer than
two weeks to report the suspected abuse." Reporting Abuse, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH,
Mar. 5, 2002, at B6, 2002 WL 2549790.
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identical to those raised sixteen years earlier in the battle for MICRA. 133
By advancing these arguments, the nursing home industry sought to
cloak itself in the protective stealth of MICRA. 134 However, doing so
should have invited debate as to whether such an extension was, in fact,
even appropriate. That analysis never occurred. Given the statute's
policies of achieving deterrence and compensation for victims, and the
availability of enhanced remedies for the last ten years, now is a
particularly appropriate time, in the light of yet another failed MICRA
reform, 135 to determine the statute's impact.
4. California's Continuing Problem and the Need for Change

Although California has had some form of an elder abuse statute since
1982, the state continues to struggle with institutional abuse. 136 In
133. See Delaney, 971 P.2d at 992. In an attempt to stall the addition of enhanced
remedies, the California Association of Health Facilities stated:
In opposition to this bill, [we] argu[e] that [it] poses a real threat to health care
institutions and health care professionals alike. [We] believe that the effect of this
bill will be to focus additional claims on health care providers, and to increase
their exposure in litigation. "The net result will simply be higher insurance
premiums for health care providers of all types."
Id. at 994. The organization only withdrew its opposition upon the imposition of a
damage cap in section 15657(b). Id.
134. See infra notes 199-231 and accompanying text. Also, arguments advanced
by both sides in the recent Florida debate over similar caps merely duplicate those
advanced early in the MICRA battle. Scandalous, VERO BEACH PRESS J., Dec. 29, 2000,
at AIO, http://www.tcpalm.com/archive/29v20ll.shtml.
Nursing-home operators say that liability-insurance costs are killing them
financially, stripping money away from elder-care budgets. They blame greedy
lawyers and insurance companies for their woes.
Insurance companies say they could hold the line on premiums if the liability
lawyers would stop suing nursing homes and if there were fewer instances of
abuse and neglect in the nursing homes.
And the lawyers say they wouldn't sue so many nursing homes for abuse and
neglect of seniors if abuse and neglect were not so commonplace. They contend
that insurance companies, in seeking to cap the damages in nursing-home
lawsuits, show little regard for the plight of some nursing-home residents.
Id.
135. See infra notes 185-98 and accompanying text.
136. See GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 22, at 2-5; sources cited supra
notes 20-23; infra notes 137--43, 249 and accompanying text. California is not the only
state with serious elder abuse problems. Others include Texas, New York, New Jersey,
and Illinois. Pear, supra note 55, at A24. In Texas alone, nearly seventy percent of all
nursing homes have serious deficiencies. Id. The number of cases investigated by
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testimony before the U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging, William
Scanlon, Director of Health Financing and Systems Issues, Health,
Education, and Human Services Division, testified that between July
1995 and February 1998 nearly one-third of California nursing homes
had been cited for serious deficiencies causing death or serious harm to
patients. 137 Further, it was discovered that "some 3,000 residents died in
more than 900 California nursing homes in 1993 as a result of
malnutrition, dehydration, sepsis from improperly treated urinary tract
infections, and other serious conditions for which they did not receive
acceptable care." 138 As a result of Scanlon's report, the California
Department of Health Services (DHS), the agency charged with
administering nursing home inspections and with licensing nursing
facilities, announced a focused crack down on the most serious
violators. 139
Two years later, California's Attorney General announced a further
investigation of California nursing homes to result in even more citations
and deterrence. 140 However, within just six short months, California
returned to the list of states with the highest numbers of reported abuse
in the country. 141 In one San Francisco home, "ants were found crawling
on the face of an 83-year-old resident, moving in and out of her
mouth." 142 In Los Angeles, "a state inspector observed a nurse assistant
using a washcloth and water soiled with feces to give a 'bed bath' to a
resident." 143
Texas' Adult Protective Services increased 176% in the last decade. Craig, supra note
16 at IB. In 1999, the agency investigated 54,478 charges, of which 35,491 were
determined legitimate instances of abuse. Id.
137. GEN. ACCOUNTING OfFICE, supra note 22, at 2.
138. Id. at 1.
139. Id. at 14. Whether the crackdown has any impact, is yet another question.
Approximately forty percent of the most serious violators are repeat offenders. See GEN.
ACCOUNTING OfFICE, supra note 23, at 1.
140. MacGregor, supra note 21, at Al 9.
141. See Pear, supra note 55, at A24.
Congressional investigators found
widespread violations of federal nursing home standards in California, including those
that had caused actual harm to residents or had resulted in death or serious injury.
Approximately nineteen percent of nursing homes in Los Angeles and an overwhelming
forty-one percent in the San Francisco area were cited. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.; see also Joe Calderone & Thomas Zambito, Elderly Suffer Abuse and
Worse: Staff Shortages Lead to Neglect, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Dec. 17, 2000, at 6, 2000
WL 29596376 (noting that some homes operate shifts with a ratio of one staff person to
every forty patients); Michael Moss, Many Elders Receive Care at Criminals' Hands,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 1998, at Bl (discussing the common problem of nursing homes
hiring individuals with arrest records, even including some felons who had been
previously convicted of homicide). Unfortunately, instances similar to these are all too
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One of the most frequently given excuses for deficiencies and abuse is
the lack of adequate staffing. 144 This is despite an OBRA mandate that
nursing homes have sufficient staff to provide the "highest practicable
physical, mental, and psychological well-being." 145
The issue has especially plagued the nursing home industry.
Historically, nursing homes suffer from a high degree of staff turnover
because of the difficulty of the work involved and low pay. 146 The
expense of hiring adequate nursing staff drains a company's bottom
line. 147 For example, one nursing home company that manages twelve
facilities in the Midwest had so many problems finding qualified staff
that it hired homeless people and nurses who stole drugs from previous
employers to care for patients. 148

common in nursing homes, not just in California, but throughout the United States. Id.
Common examples of abuse include patients left lying in their own urine and feces,
patients not being given pain medication for weeks despite painful medical treatments,
sexual abuse of patients, and inattention to patients' bedsores, slips and falls. See
discussion anc;I sources cited supra notes 14--23; infra notes 249-51 and accompanying
text.
144. See Pear, supra note 55, at A24. "Nursing homes with a low ratio of
employees to patients are 'significantly more likely to have quality-of-care
problems,' ... and 'substantial increases' in staff may be required to ensure that homes
do not endanger the safety or health of patients." Robert Pear, U.S. Recommending Strict
New Rules at Nursing Homes: Concern over Staffing, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2000, at 1
[hereinafter Pear, Concern Over Staffing]. "To reach the recommended staffing
levels, ... nursing homes would have to hire 77,000 to 137,000 registered nurses, 22,000
to 27,000 licensed practical nurses and 181,000 to 310,000 nurse's aides." Robert Pear,
9 of IO Nursing Homes in U.S. Lack Adequate Staff, a Government Study Finds, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 18, 2002, at Al 1 [hereinafter, Pear, 9 of IO Nursing Homes].
145. See Quinn, supra note 57, at 659.
146. Deacon, supra note 60, at 29. Average pay of a certified nursing assistant is
eight dollars per hour. Mark Hollis, Nursing Homes Look for Antidote to Staff
Shortages, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Dec. 11, 2001, at SB, 2001 WL 29960761. "In
California, nursing assistants can earn more flipping burgers than caring for the elderly
in nursing homes." Clement, supra note 11, at 2. "Some nursing homes report turnover
among nurses' aides of as high as 100 percent-they replace their entire front-line staffs
in a year." Virginia Young, Bill That Would Stiffen Penalties for Nursing Homes Wins
Support, ST. LoUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 7, 2002, at B2, 2002 WL 2544794.
147. Balisok, supra note 26, at 42. Balisok notes that assuming that the average
profit of a 100-bed facility is $350,000 per year, adding one nurse's aide per shift
increases salary expenditures by roughly $60,000. Id.
148. Michele Munz, Families Sue Nursing Home Firm, Charging that Residents
Died from Neglect, ST. LoUIS POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 5, 2000, at Al, available at 2000
WL3558182.

623

Such staffing nightmares, though, are not the only roadblock to
overcoming the state's problem with abuse. The primary motivation
behind the enhanced remedies of EADACPA is to encourage attorneys
to represent clients in elder abuse cases. 149 To get the enhanced EADACPA
remedies, parties must show "clear and convincing evidence" of
actionable conduct. 150 However, this evidentiary standard is widely
considered to constitute a barrier. 151 Although EADACPA provides for
attorney's fees, such fees are rarely awarded in practice. 152 Instead, they
are usually the first item to be offered as a bargaining chip in settlement
negotiations. 153 While good news to defense attorneys, it is interesting
to note that eighty-five to ninety percent of all malpractice cases settle
outside of litigation. 154 Of those that go to trial, more than seventy
percent are won by defense firms. 155
As a result, many plaintiffs' attorneys allege a host of claims, including
those based on intent, fraud, malice or recklessness, in order to avoid
MICRA limitations. 156 In tum, industry advocates cry foul and accuse
plaintiffs of using these tactics in a hunting season against nursing homes.
Perhaps they are right. Instead of plaintiffs' attorneys padding complaints
with attenuated theories of liability, the real target should be MICRA.
149. Stem, supra note 108, at 5.
150. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE§ 15657 (West 2001).
151. Anna Snider, Law on Elder Abuse Gets Little Attention, L.A. DAILY J., June 4,
1996, at 1; Grinfeld, supra note 76, at 42. The clear and convincing evidence standard
requires a greater degree of proof than preponderance of the evidence. Because often the
only evidence remaining after a patient's death is nursing records, such a standard is
difficult to prove. Other patients may not be able to communicate, suffer from faulty
memories, or be fearful of intimidation or retaliation. See Rogers, supra note 18, at 1L.
152. Snider, supra note 151, at 1. Although, in Delaney the California Supreme
Court awarded actual attorney's fees that surpassed compensatory damages. See supra
note 125 and accompanying text.
153. Snider, supra note 151, at 9.
154. See OTA, supra note 32, at 12.
155. Malpractice Insurance Trends: Impact on Access to Obstetric Care: Interim
Hearing Before the California Senate Comm. on Health and Human Servs., 1985-86
Reg. Sess. 84 (1985) [hereinafter California Hearings]; OTA, supra note 32, at 12 ("Of
claims against physicians that went to trial between 1975 and 1978, more than four out
of five were won by the defense."); Webb, supra note 27, at 19 ("In more than two-thirds
of malpractice cases, insurers and researchers say, patients receive no money. For those
people who win malpractice cases, compensation tends to be relatively meager,
according to published reports.").
156. See Russell S. Balisok, Understanding Actions Against Skilled Nursing
Facilities, in 2 CALIFORNIA ELDER LAW: AN ADV0CATE'S GUIDE §§ 12.38-53, 12.61,
12.69 (CEB Attorneys eds. 2000); Gray, supra note 28, at 91, 92-94; Fred J. Hiestand,
MICRA Management: Cap on Noneconomic Medical Malpractice Damages ls Being
Attacked on Two Fronts, L.A. DAILY J., March 4, 1999, at 6 (noting the use of "courtimposed increases of the ... damages cap" to avoid application of MICRA).

624

[Vol. 39: 599, 2002]

California's Elder Abuse Act
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

ill. THE MEDICAL INJURY COMPENSATION REFORM ACT

"In my judgment, no lasting solution is possible without
sacrifice and fundamental reform." 157
The Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975 158 (MICRA)
was passed in an attempt to control runaway malpractice insurance
premiums of the mid-70s. Throughout the country, malpractice liability
premiums had escalated to the point that many doctors considered
leaving their practices altogether. Congress took up emergency hearings
on the matter as literally hundreds of remedial proposals flooded state
legislatures that year. 159 In the end, Congress turned to the states and to
California in particular, which at the time, was experiencing some of the
worst problems, to handle their respective insurance problems. 160
California insurance premiums rose by 300 to 400% in just one
year. 161 Doctors threatened to quit practicing medicine and held back
much needed services such as infant deliveries. 162 The crisis reached its

157. Dresslar, supra note 6, at 1 (quoting Governor Jerry Brown in his May 16,
1975 speech convening the special session of the legislature to pass MICRA).
158. Also known by the acronym of MICRA, Assembly Bill 1:XX was enacted
during the Second Extraordinary Session of 1975. At the time, it was hailed as "the
savior of the medical profession." California Hearings, supra note 155, at 14. MICRA
refers to several statutes that restrict or place conditions upon plaintiffs' causes of action
and remedies when directed at health care providers for professional negligence. See
discussion and sources cited supra note 80 for the MICRA provisions as they are
codified in various sections of the California Code.
159. Continuing Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis, 1975: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Health of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 94th Cong. 18
(1975) (statement of Steven A. Grossman, Georgetown University Health Policy
Center).
160. See OTA, supra note 32, at 13.
Physicians' malpractice premiums vary by the State or locality in which they
practice, the specialty or sub-specialty of practice, and sometimes the number of
hours worked, years in practice, and attendance at risk management training
sessions . . . . Malpractice insurers almost never base their physician premiums on
the specific experience of an individual doctor. Malpractice claims for an
individual physician are so rare and unpredictable that past experience is a poor
indicator of future suits.
Id.
161. Dresslar, supra note 1, at 1.
162. Rosemary Johnston, Medical Malpractice Battle Heats Up Again, SENIOR
HEALTII, reprinted in California Hearings, supra note 155, at 84 (describing how some
specialists paid more than $185,000 for malpractice insurance); Lois Richardson, Why
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brink when Travelers' Indemnity Company raised its premiums in the
Los Angeles area by nearly 500%. 163
To respond, then Governor Edmund G. "Jerry" Brown, Jr., 164 called an
emergency session of the legislature. 165 Both doctors and insurers joined
efforts to lobby the legislature and to approve MICRA. The California
Legislature adopted the MICRA package that contained several
provisions aimed principally at reducing the number of malpractice
lawsuits and controlling malpractice premiums and costs. 166 Proponents
of the new legislation argued that without it, most if not all of the state's
doctors would be left uninsured. 167 In fact, an estimated twenty percent
of doctors in California were uninsured at the time. 168 Only those who
California Needs MICRA, CAL. HEALTH L. MONITOR, Mar. 9, 1998, at 2.
163. Richardson, supra note 162, at 2. In Southern California, Travelers' premiums
rose 486%; in Northern California, the increases were less severe, only 341 %. Other
examples of hikes include: Argonaut, 320% and CNA, 190%. Dresslar, supra note l. In
1981, Travelers settled a lawsuit filed by doctors in Southern California who alleged that
the insurance company overcharged them. Id. at 5. The settlement provided 5500
doctors with nearly $50 million in reimbursements. Id.
164. Currently, Jerry Brown serves as Mayor of Oakland, California. Described as
a "hippie-Jesuit Democrat," see Dresslar, supra note 6, at I, Brown, also a lawyer, is
known for his off-the-cuff remarks and antics. In 1975, when physicians' wives staged
sleep-ins in his office to protest the rising malpractice rates, Brown felt they were too
comfortable and ordered in hardwood flooring and prison furniture to help them
appreciate the true nature of sacrifice. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Jan Norris, MICRA Madness: An Insurance Defense Attorney Argues That It's
Time to Lift the MICRA Limits, CAL. LAW., Dec. 2000, at 48. Nearly all of the insurance
companies pulled out of California, leaving the Department of Insurance to authorize the
formation of a handful of doctor-owned companies, some of which remain today. See
id.; see also Professional Liability Insurance: Joint Interim Hearing Before the Senate
Committees 011 Business and Professions and Insurance, Claims, and Corporations,
1986-87 Reg. Sess. 2 (Cal. 1987) [hereinafter Professional Liability Insurance Hearing]
(statement of Richard Roth, Assistant Commissioner, California Department of
Insurance). In 1985, these companies returned approximately $18 million to the doctors
in the form of policyholder dividends. Id. This practice was cited as somewhat
orchestrated by the medical insurance industry and a "hoax" to allow doctors and
insurance companies to publicly criticize escalating insurance premiums. California
Hearings, supra note 155, at 31-37 (written statement of Samuel Shore, Vice President
of the California Trial Lawyers Association). In addition, the 1987 hearings reviewed a
General Accounting Office study of medical malpractice that paid special attention to
California and four other states. "In terms of the financial condition, availability, and
stability of rates, the California system is the best in the country." Professional Liability
Insurance: Joint Interim Hearing Before the California Senate Comm. on Business and
Professions, 1986-87 Reg. Sess. 2 (1987) (statement of Richard Roth).
168. Richardson, supra note 162, at 2 ("Many [doctors] performed more defensive
tests and treatments, thus increasing health care costs.").
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passed their premiums on to their patients remained-and these would
contribute to escalating health care costs, an undesirable alternative. 169
In some aspects, MICRA was considered more a compromise than a
cure. Dozens of proposals were introduced in the assembly that year,
but only MICRA passed. In legislative hearings a decade later, to
support its contention that MICRA was working, the insurance industry
admitted that the statutes had been successful in controlling malpractice
claims against California physicians. 170
Perhaps most controversial of all the MICRA statutes was, and is still,
the limit on noneconomic damages found in California Civil Code
section 3333.2. 171 This section limits noneconomic damages to a
maximum of $250,000. 172 Noneconomic damages, which typically
compensate plaintiffs for pain, emotional distress, mental anguish, and
other economic losses not covered by compensatory damages, are highly
controversial because of their subjective nature. 173 Despite this,
MICRA' s chief criticism has been that the caps are simply outdated and
overdue for an increase. Not since the enactment of MICRA has the cap
been raised, though there have been attempts. In February 1997,
Assemblywoman Sheila Kuehl introduced Assembly Bill (AB) 250
which sought to raise the cap to $700,000, but the bill died in

169. See id.
170. See California Hearings, supra note 155, at 14-15.
171. The statute provides: "In any action for injury against a health care provider
based on professional negligence, the injured plaintiff shall be entitled to recover
noneconomic losses to compensate for pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical
impairment, disfigurement and other nonpecuniary damage." CAL. CIV. CODE §
3333.2(a) (West 1997). However, subsection (b) limits the amount recoverable: "In no
action shall the amount of damages for noneconomic losses exceed two hundred fifty
thousand dollars ($250,000)." Id.§ 3333.2(b).
172. Id. § 3333.2(b). The "first assault" on this particular aspect of MICRA came
in the case of Fein v. Permanente Med. Group, 695 P.2d 665 (Cal. 1985), in which the
California Supreme Court rejected the argument that section 3333.2 violated due process
rights and equal protection. Id. at 679, 683. In Fein, the court found that public policy
interests outweighed individual rights, and affirming the cap would reduce the exposure
of insurers, reduce the number of lawsuits filed, and would ultimately increase
settlements. Id. at 681 n.17; Norris, supra note 167, at 48, 50.
173. OTA, supra note 32, at 12. For example, in one study, juries hearing
comparable cases with similar, serious permanent injuries awarded varying recoveries
ranging from a low of $147,000 to a little over $18 million. Id. Many suggest that such
differences occur because of lack of any objective criteria provided by the court to the
jury in deciding pain and suffering damages. Id.
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cornmittee. 174 In 1999, Assembly Speaker Antonio Villaraigosa revived
an attempt to raise the limit with AB 1380, backed by the Consumer
Attorneys of California, a plaintiffs' bar. 175 It too was unsuccessful. 176
While this Comment does not seek the abolition or increase of
MICRA's cap as a whole, as was proposed in both AB 250 and AB
1380, it is worthwhile to note that such limits are found only in medical
malpractice suits and not in any other form of negligence actions. Nor is
a cap imposed on RCFEs. 177
Today, most critics argue that the noneconomic damages cap of
$250,000 is vastly inadequate. 178 Although malpractice insurance
premiums were brought under control after the MICRA crisis, 179
nonetheless, they have since risen along with litigation costs. 180
Malpractice premiums in California alone have risen approximately
thirty-seven percent in the last four years. 181 Meanwhile, the amount of
174. Assemb. B. 250, 1997-1998 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1998) (showing that Assembly
Bill 250 was introduced February 11, 1997 by Assemblyperson Kuehl, and died on
inactive file February 2, 1998); see also Richardson, supra note 162, at 3.
175. See infra notes 185-98 and accompanying text.
176. Id.
177. Stem, supra note 55, at 5. Foreseeably, an elderly patient could suffer
identical abuse or neglect in either an RCFE or a SNF, yet recovery against the RCFE is
not limited, while recovery against the SNF would be capped.
178. Dresslar, supra note 6; Norris, supra note 167, at 51.
179. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
180. Charles Inlander, Commentary: Truth About Medical Malpractice Insurance
and Lawsuits (Minnesota Public Radio, Marketplace Morning Report, Jan. 31, 2002),
2002 WL 4428829 (stating that "doctors all across the country are facing large increases
in their annual rates" and that "[o]n average, rates rose 10 percent last year"). Whether
MICRA caps have actually resulted in lowering of malpractice premiums remains
somewhat a mystery. While California's Department of Insurance believes that such
premiums have been and are under control, no one but the insurance companies can
answer that question and, for many reasons, they remain guarded. See Norris, supra note
167, at 51. Mr. Inlander, a critic and president of the People's Medical Society explains:
Studies show that the number of medical malpractice lawsuits has been steady for
years. There has been no significant increase....
The primary reason malpractice insurance rates have soared in the last year or so
is because the stock market collapsed and interest rates have dropped ....
[M]edical malpractice insurance companies take the premiums doctors and
hospitals pay and invest them. Throughout most of the 1990s, these investments
were earning well over 10 percent annually. As a result, companies either reduced
premiums or kept them steady, maintaining their required financial reserves on the
money earned from investments. But last year all that changed. Many insurers
either lost money on their investments or earned just 1 percent or 2 percent, so
their only recourse was to raise rates and raise them quickly.
Inlander, supra.
181. State Legislation: Taking the Pulse of Med-Mal Measures, ATLA ADVOCATE,
Dec. 2001, at 1, 2. Meanwhile, "premiums nationwide rose just 5.7 percent." Id. at 2.
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damages a plaintiff can recover has not. Adjusted for cost of living, a
1975 cap of $250,000 would be worth only $83,000 today. 182 To have
the same impact in economic terms today as originally set, the cap
would have to be raised to nearly $900,000. 183 However, it has remained
virtually untouched for twenty-six years. 184
A. The 1999 Battle

It may seem easy to diagnose the problem with MICRA's application
to the Elder Abuse Act, but treating it is an altogether different battle.
To understand the difficulty in amending MICRA, consider the most
recent attempt In 1999, Assembly Speaker Antonio Villaraigosa sponsored
AB 1380 which sought to raise the noneconomic cap on damages in
malpractice actions. 185 It suffered a great defeat. 186 Villaraigosa
originally attempted to raise the limits to $475,000 but after intense
negotiations, he backed down from including a specific amount. 187
Rather, he proposed an annual cost of living adjustment, to increase as
needed each February. 188 Although Villaraigosa, a Democrat from Los
Angeles and recent mayoral candidate, sponsored the bill, the majority

182. Norris, supra note 167, at 51.
183. Id. (stating that "adjusted for inflation, the cap would have to be raised to more
than $890,000"). Other estimates have placed the value in 1999 dollars to be somewhere
between $750,000 and $1 million. Tom Dresslar, Legislative Triage in Progress on Bill
to Raise MICRA Limits, L.A. DAILY J., July 15, 1999, at 1.
184. The attorney who successfully argued the four major provisions of MICRA
before the California Supreme Court, and still defends it, stated seventeen years ago that
it was very likely the $250,000 cap would be increased:
The argument is that the $250,000 limit on pain and suffering is too low; $250,000
in 1975 was a lot more in purchasing power than it is now because of the rampant
inflation we have had over much of the past 10 years. Personally, I find that to be
a reasonable argument. I would not be surprised to see some raising of this limit.
They claim a lot of very capable plaintiffs' lawyers will no longer take these cases
because they are expensive to prepare, the risk of losing is high and therefore the
reward has to be greater than the schedule set forth in the statute. Now, what I
argued in the Supreme Court when they challenged the constitutionality of the fee
schedule is that any grievance should be taken to the legislature.
California Hearings, supra note 155, at 99 (interview with Ellis J. Horvitz).
185. Dresslar, supra note 183; discussion infra note 189.
186. See discussion and sources cited infra notes 189-95.
187. Tom Dresslar, Effort to Lift Cap On MICRA Fails, at Least for Now, L.A.
DAILY J., May 25, 1999, at 1.
188. Id.
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of California Democrats in the legislature retracted their support. 189 The
Republicans stood strong and unanimous in their opposition to any
increase in the cap. 190
Outside the assembly hall, opposition to AB 1380 came not only from
pro-MICRA groups and lobbyists, such as Californians Allied for
Patient Protection (CAPP), 191 but also from a host of nonprofit
organizations that CAPP enlisted to gamer public support against the
increase. 192 Together, they alleged that raising the cap would drive up
malpractice insurance premiums and slash access to health care,
particularly to groups in need of greater access, such as minorities, the
poor and women. 193 It is thus clear that without a major turnaround in
the assembly's mindset, any legislative amendment to increase the cap
on noneconomic changes is highly unlikely, 194 even though some
189. Id. Only twenty-three of forty-seven Democrats supported raising the cap. Id.
In a letter dated May 18, 1999 to Villaraigosa, the majority Democrats said they were
"'not prepared to support any increase in the ... cap' until, among other conditions, a
'consensus develops within our caucus."' Id.
190. Id.
191. "CAPP, a coalition of health care providers and insurers, has hired four of the
Capitol's most influential lobbying firms." Tom Dresslar, Intrigue Surrounds Drafting of
MICRA Refonns, L.A. DA1LY J., April 19, 1999, at 5. "From Jan. 1, 1997, to June 30, 1998,
those firms' lobbying income totaled roughly $10.1 million. And their principals include
former lawmakers, high-ranking government officials and legislative staffers." Id.
192. Some of the groups included Planned Parenthood and nonprofit clinics that
serve minority neighborhoods. Id.
193. Dresslar, supra note 183 at 1. Such hyperbole was described by one
"anonymous" defense attorney as unreliable. See Norris, supra note 167, at 51.
"Norris," a pseudonym for a partner in a firm that defends medical malpractice suits,
writes that:
In that respect, the medical-insurance complex-er, the Californians Allied for
Patient Protection and other such groups-has deliberately adopted the methods of
the National Rifle Association to prevent changes in the law. They ask whether
MICRA has worked and respond unequivocally-as if no further inquiry were
necessary-that everyone has benefited from MICRA. They use half-truths to
underscore that patients are receiving greater percentages of their awards because
of the restricted attorneys fees, and they trumpet that patients are assured of a
long-term income stream (albeit, again, of a substantially lesser amount), rather
than a lump-sum payment (which, they add paternalistically "might not be
managed appropriately over the long term"). They wield statistics, suggesting that
eliminating the damages cap would increase medical malpractice premiums and
the cost of health care in California.
They also tell stories of doctors close to retirement age who would simply leave
the profession and abandon their patients if MICRA is diluted. And they compile
million-dollar war chests to distribute to legislators who are willing to sign
"loyalty oaths" to uphold MICRA.
Id.
194. Id.
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hospitals reportedly are willing to support a higher limit. 195
Proponents of MICRA contend that it "reduces costs underlying high
medical malpractice insurance premiums" and that "it has helped to keep
health care more affordable and accessible." 196 Yet, research shows that
to have an effect so deleterious as to actually increase malpractice
premiums, the cap must be raised by millions of dollars. 197
Villaraigosa' s proposal would have only raised the limit to $475,000. 198

B. Arguments Advanced in Support of MICRA
"California can't afford to take money out of the health care
system to give it to lawyers." 199
MICRA represents a good policy tradeoff. Injured patients are adequately
compensated, while ''bad" doctors are punished, health care costs are held down,
and access to risky but necessary health care procedures is ensured. Now is not
the time to increase the costs of health care to benefit the small number of injured
patients who win the lawsuit lottery-and give trial lawyers a bigger paycheck.200

1. Curtailing Malpractice Premiums

The strongest argument against such reform is the control of
malpractice premiums, the very basis for enacting MICRA. 201 When
rates escalated in 1975, most of California's malpractice insurers left the
state, leaving many doctors uninsured. 202 Despite claims to the contrary
that California's MICRA guidelines were working, medical malpractice
litigation continued to increase.203 And, although currently seventy
195. Dresslar, supra note 183, at 1. Even the attorney who argued MICRA's
constitutionality stated nearly a decade and a half ago that such limits could be
legitimately raised. See discussion and source cited supra note 184.
196. Hiestand, supra note 156, at 6.
197. Dresslar, supra note 6, at 1.
198. Id. ("Adjusting the limit to reflect increases in the Consumer Price Index since
1975 would bring the amount to more than $750,000. Using other inflation indices
would move the figure closer to $1 million."). See also Dresslar, supra note 187, at 1
(noting AB1380's original limit of$475,000).
199. Richardson, supra note 162, at 4.
200. Id.
201. See Norris, supra note 167, at 48, 51.
202. Richardson, supra note 162, at 2.
203. See California Hearings, supra note 155, at 15 (statement of William
Rosenzweig, M.D. and president-elect of the California Association of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists).
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percent of these cases are decided in favor of the defendant, it still costs
significant amounts to defend such cases. 204
Proponents of maintaining the caps contend that rising malpractice
premiums and costs associated with this litigation can have disastrous
effects, including dissuading some doctors from practicing or encouraging
them to pass increased costs on to their patients. Given that most elderly
patients have very little financial resources, any such increases could
seriously undermine the nation's health care system.205
One of the nation's largest insurers tracked data for 1550 hospital
insureds after the 1970s crisis. 206 "Both the number and the severity
of claims nearly doubled between 1978 and 1983," with the dollar
value of loss, including legal fees, rising from $6,400 to $12,785. 207
The average jury verdict for malpractice suits also rose nationally
from $180,000 in 1974 to $404,726 in 1980.208 The number of jury
verdicts totaling $1 million or more also rose "from five or fewer
each year between 1973 and 1976 to 20 in 1980, 50 in 1981, and 70 in
1983."209
To support the extension of these arguments to their position, many
nursing home and health care providers cite similar trends. According to
Jury Verdict Research, nursing home litigation is the fastest growing
area of litigation in the U.S., with the average award almost doubling
from $238,285 to $525,853 from 1987 to 1994.210 Of course, such
In 1975 there were 14,000 claims nationwide against physicians. In 1983 there
were over 40,000. In 1979 there were 3.3 claims per 100 physicians on the
average, and by 1984 this had risen to 20.3. By mid 1984 60 percent of all
physicians had been sued at least once, and you have just heard now that that
figure is up to 75 percent. Best Insurance Management reports on the first six
months of 1984 that this was the worst year in history for malpractice casualties.
$1.62 is taken out for every $1 in premiums collected. Malpractice losses in
California have risen from an average of $5,000 per settlement in 1975 to
$650,000 in 1984, and appear to be doubling yearly.

Id.
204.
See OTA, supra note 32, at 12; Webb, supra note 27, at 19. In the 1985 hearing,
Rosenzweig testified that, on the average, it costs about $40,000 to defend each case before
trial. California Hearings, supra note 155, at 15. Unsuccessful claims resulted in double that
amount of costs, this despite that only sixteen to thirty cents of every premium dollar ever
makes to an injured patient. Id. 'Toe rest is eaten up by the system." Id
205.
See Richardson, supra note 162, at 4.
206.
California Hearings, supra note 155, at 114 (citing data compiled by St. Paul
Fire and Marine Insurance Company).
207.
Id. at 114-15.
208.
Id. at 115.
209.
Id.
210.
Edward Felsenthal, Jury Awards Rise for Improper Care of Elderly, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 5, 1995, at Bl.
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increases take into account states with greater limits than California, and
those that do not impose limits on malpractice awards at all. In addition,
the averages include several multimillion dollar verdicts against nursing
homes for outrageous conduct.211
MICRA allies argue that, in California, MICRA has contributed to
much needed savings in litigation costs and insurance payouts, thereby
controlling premiums.212 A study by the Medical Insurance Exchange of
California, a doctor-owned carrier, projected that MICRA accounted for
savings of nearly $30 million in claims in 1997.213 Even so, the average
individual payout increased "from $811,280 in 1990 to $870,523 in
1997."214
Another study also found MICRA' s noneconomic damages limit
saved carriers $516 million in claims payments over ten years. 215
Notwithstanding these substantial savings, malpractice insurance
premiums have continued to rise,216 leading some industry watchers to
believe the crisis created by the insurers in the 1970s actually had more
to do with bad investments than runaway litigation.217
2. Prevention of Escalating Health Care Costs

The second most widely cited rationale for preserving MICRA' s status
quo deals with its impact on health care costs. Many health care

211. Examples include a case against Horizon/CMS Healthcare in Texas for $82
million, out of which the plaintiff will be paid $20 million due to a pretrial cap
negotiated between the parties. Kate Hunger, Jury Hits Nursing Home: $82 Million
Verdict Won't Be Paid, Though, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Feb. 24, 2001, at IA.
Yet another Texas home was ordered to pay $312.9 million in damages to one patient
who developed sixteen severe bedsores during her stay. Jurors Fine Nursing Home
$312.8 Million for Neglect, HOUSTON CHRON., Feb. 12, 2001, at 15, 2001 WL 2998852.
Most verdicts, however, are "relatively meager." Webb, supra note 27, at 19.
212. Dresslar, supra note 1, at I.
213. Id. at 5.
214. Id.
215. Id. The ten-year period encompasses 1986 to 1996. Id.
216. Balisok, supra note 26, at 41 (indicating that malpractice premiums are rising
twenty to twenty-five percent each year).
217. Some critics suggest that the crisis was created in order for the insurance
companies to shift the blame for increasing malpractice premiums to lawyers rather than
deal with fallout from physicians. See Professional Liability Insurance Hearing, supra
note 167 ("In fact, during 1985, about $18 million was paid back to doctors in the form
of policyholder dividends."); see also GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 83; supra
note 163 and accompanying text.
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providers and insurers suggest that MICRA protects our health care
system from risky practices and escalating medical costs.
Currently, approximately 6.5 million people in California lack health
care coverage. 218 The county and university hospitals, which provide the
most care to uninsured patients are "financially strapped, and every
dollar they must pay an attorney is a dollar that cannot be used to
provide patient care."219 As the argument goes, patients will face either
increased costs or less care. Even more constricting on their budgets,
hospitals in the state must allocate some $20 billion to meeting new
seismic safety standards between now and 2030. 220 And, this does not
include the fallout still uncertain from California's recent electricity
crisis and escalating power bills. As such, any increases in operating
costs, industry leaders argue, will most certainly be passed on to patients
in the form of increased treatment costs.221
3. Avoiding Defensive Medicine

There is also the concern by many that increasing liability will lead
more physicians to practice defensive medicine-the prescribing of
unnecessary tests and procedures-to protect themselves from being
sued.222 With seniors, children and other high risk groups, these
concerns are elevated. According to one industry newsletter for seniors,
"the abolishment of MICRA reforms could mean more "defensive
medicine" . . . . That leads to higher costs."223 However, the costs of
such defensive practices and procedures remain unknown. 224
4. Availability of Punitive Damages

Nursing home advocates highlight the fact that MICRA does not
prohibit the recovery of punitive damages. 225 Such damages must be

218. Richardson, supra note 162, at 4.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. See id.; Dresslar, supra note 1, at 1.
222. OTA, supra note 32, at iii; Webb, supra note 27, at 19 (interviewing one
physician who stated that rather than quitting her practice, she would "take a more
'defensive' approach to practicing medicine" if insurance rates rise).
223. Rosemary Johnston, Medical Malpractice Battle Heats Up Again, SENIOR
HEALTH, reprinted in California Hearings, supra note 155, at 84.
224. OTA, supra note 32, at iii.
225. Richardson, supra note 162, at 3. Rather, plaintiffs must meet the procedural
requirements under California law to plead punitive damages showing there is a
substantial likelihood they will prevail at trial. Upon that determination, the trial court
may enter an order allowing the plaintiff to plead punitive damages. See infra note 227.
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paid from the providers' own pockets, not those of their insurers. 226
Because of this, nursing home supporters suggest that plaintiffs are no
worse off with the MICRA cap, and deterrence can be maintained.
However, the availability of these damages is not without significant
restriction. In another provision, MICRA requires plaintiffs seeking
punitive damages to file affidavits showing a substantial likelihood they
will prevail on such damages before they can allege them against a
health care provider.227 Furthermore, MICRA's limits may not be
disclosed to the jury,228 leaving open the possibility that jurors may trade
punitive damages for pain and suffering awards, only to have the court
reduce the ultimate noneconomic damages award.
Extending MICRA's punitive damages restrictions to the Elder Abuse
Act, the Fourth District Court of Appeal recently held that section
425.13(a) of the Civil Code applies to elder abuse claims in Community
Care and Habilitation Center v. Superior Court. 229 Noting that section
425.13 "does not mean that the Elderly Abuse Act plaintiff will lose a
valuable right; it merely means that punitive damages cannot be
demanded in bad faith or as a tactical ploy designed to coerce a hasty
settlement."230 Highlighting the judiciary's attitude regarding protection
of the elderly, the court found:
[n]o reason ... why such persons should receive more favorable treatment with
respect to punitive damages than other injured persons bringing suit against health
care providers. There is no reason to suppose that the elderly and dependent (or
their representatives) are less likely to bring unsubstantiated claims for punitive
226. Richardson, supra note 162, at 3.
227. The Code states:
In any action for damages arising out of the professional negligence of a health
care provider, no claim for punitive damages ... shall be included in a complaint
or other pleading unless the court enters an order allowing an amended pleading
that includes a claim for punitive damages to be filed. The court may allow the
filing of an amended pleading claiming punitive damages on a motion by the party
seeking the amended pleading and on the basis of the supporting and opposing
affidavits presented that the plaintiff has established that there is a substantial
probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim pursuant to Section 3294 of
the Civil Code.
CAL. Crv. CODE§ 425.13(a) (Supp. 2002).
228. One court recommended that jurors not be instructed as to the $250,000 limit
to avoid discounting interest on future damages to present value. Only after the verdict
does the judge reduce the award, thus allowing interest to be paid on future pain and
suffering. Schiembeck v. Haight, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 716, 880--81 (Ct. App. 1992).
229. 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 343 (Ct. App. 2000).
230. Id. at 349.
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damages than other plaintiffs. Given the strong legislative concerns over the
potential abuse of such claims . . . we are reluctant to open the door in this
respect. 231

Indeed, given twenty-six years of MICRA entrenchment, it is unlikely
that significant change will occur to any other MICRA provision, at least
in the courts. However, it may still be possible to modify the limits
contained in the Elder Abuse Act and, thus, achieve some true form of
deterrence and compensation. This change, though, must come from the
legislature.
C. Reform is Possible

Primum non nocere. 232

Despite arguments that MICRA is necessary to an efficient and
effective health care system, reform within EADACPA is possible.
Elder abuse in nursing homes is different from traditional medical
malpractice committed by doctors. 233 First, such "nursing home
malpractice" occurs mainly due to lack of attention to patients. 234 In
many instances, patients may go without seeing a medical doctor. 235 In
these cases, one must question whether such negligent acts are really
medical malpractice at all versus some other form of custodial neglect. 236
Defense attorneys, insurers, and health care providers argue that
231. Id. at 350.
232. Latin meaning: "First do no harm." Steven Craig Fox, Primum Non Nocere
(First Do No Harm): Nursing Home Litigation, Part II, 8 J. LEG. NURSE CONS. 8, 8
(1997) (appearing in a three-part series of articles highlighting the requirements on
nursing homes imposed by OBRA).
233. See Balisok, supra note 156, at§ 12.38. In nursing homes, nurses exercise the
preponderance of care of patients, often delegating the work to nursing assistants.
Doctors are infrequent visitors. Often, injuries which occur in nursing homes are not
related to the administration of any particular procedure or medication. Rather, unsafe
conditions promote slip and falls; nurses attend to more patients than they should,
spending less time with individual patients in need of attention; and patients lack
competent supervision.
234. Pear, Concern Over Staffing, supra note 144 (reporting on an eight-year study
which found that much of the poor care in nursing homes could be traced to inadequate
staffing and patient oversight).
235. See generally Grinfeld, supra note 58 (quoting one medical director who said
that "physicians are generally absent from nursing homes ... even doctors who attend to
nursing home residents tend to see them in their office rather than in the facility");
Andrew Julien, Where Have All the Doctors Gone?, HARTFORD COURANT, Mar. 29,
2001, at Al, A12001 WL 4557347 (noting that many physicians are cutting back on
nursing home visits).
236. See Bush v. Green Oaks Operator, Inc., 39 S.W.3d 669, 672-73 (Tex. App.
2001).
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malpractice lawsuits exist because plaintiffs' attorneys enlist whomever they
can to make themselves rich.237 Yet very few acknowledge that actual abuse
precedes the litigation. Furthermore, even fewer recognize the plaintiffs'
increased evidentiary burden to plead an Elder Abuse Act violation.238
Plaintiffs' attorneys argue that malpractice suits would not exist if not
for malpractice, and that if health care providers want to control
litigation, they simply must practice better medicine. 239 Within the
context of nursing homes, the plaintiffs' attorneys may be right. Doctors
spend less time with patients.240 Some nursing home patients may never
even see a doctor. 241 Rather than to forewarn of increased litigation
costs and lack of access for the elderly, nursing homes and providers
should focus on why so many patients are overlooked by physicians.
Patients should not sacrifice medical care and attention simply because
they are in a nursing home. Indeed, in nursing homes it should be easier
to provide consistent, quality care. Neither should the elderly be made
to bear the burden for institutional and managerial problems, such as
poor staffing or inadequate care, through their own pocketbooks or
suffering. To address the problem, nursing homes must feel as if they
will be held accountable. Large corporate chains must understand
liability in terms they can measure; the bottom line should reflect bad
decision making and mismanagement.
237. See Deacon, supra note 60, at 29; Richardson, supra note 162, at 3.
238. Recently, one defense attorney came forth to admit MICRA's shortcomings
and to call for its reform, but did so anonymously. Norris, supra note 167, at 48 ("The
author is a partner in a firm that handles a substantial amount of medical malpractice
defense. Not wanting to undermine the credibility of his partners with their clients, the
author is writing under a pseudonym."). Surprisingly, this attorney even advocates
raising the MICRA cap. Id. at 51.
239. See supra notes 222-23 and accompanying text. The application of the
defensive medicine argument is an interesting one since it implies doctors selectively
choose the level of treatment to provide based on external factors. It also implies that the
capacity of physicians and nursing homes to improve the care they offer nursing home
residents is more than a possibility.
240. Most doctors who make nursing home visits rarely examine their patients,
relying instead on nurses and other staff to make health care decisions. While some
might argue this is efficient, a doctor's time with a patient may be little more than social.
As a result, patient care suffers, and many symptoms go undiagnosed. See supra note
235.
241. Due to other commitments by doctors and the sheer numbers of patients in a
nursing home, phone consultations with nurses are typically preferred. Again, it seems
that treatments provided are only as good as those diagnosing the problem, that is, nurses
and certified nursing assistants rather than physicians. See sources cited supra note 235.
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Economists posit that patients decide to sue based largely in part on
expected net returns. 242 Most tort reforms, therefore, particularly those
that concern medical malpractice, have targeted damages to reduce the
"financial incentives to sue."243 Others create procedural requirements
or change the substantive rules for determining negligence in order to
make it more difficult for a plaintiff to win. 244
Regardless of the method, concern for patients is rarely a concern in
tort reform. 245 Reducing malpractice rates and increasing access have
not truly been made priorities. 246 Likewise, many meritorious claims go
unfiled. 247 Yet most reforms are dominated by the perception of a
pending malpractice crisis, like that of 1975.248
But what of the abuse, even the egregious abuse, which prompted the
Elder Abuse Act amendments in the first place? It still occurs and is,
unfortunately, still quite dramatic. For example, one eighty-three-yearold woman, an Alzheimer's patient at a home in Sacramento, was
found by her great niece locked outside overnight, with a broken rib,
bloody face and a large bruise on her forearm. 249 In Texas, a woman
died after eight pounds of flesh were removed from a bedsore. 250 In
other cases, bedsores have been ignored to the point that they have
contained feces and maggots. 251
While such horrible examples are hopefully atypical; nonetheless, they
exist.252 It is hard to argue that such instances are products of litigation,
rather than of malpractice. Nursing homes must own up to the lack of
care they provide and be ultimately responsible to the families of their

242. OTA, supra note 32, at 24. Prosecuting such cases by plaintiffs' attorneys
often means relying on expensive expert testimony that may threaten a plaintiffs
potential recovery. To justify bringing an action, damages are almost always the
defining issue. See also Webb, supra note 27, at 13 ("The high cost of litigation, in turn,
discourages patients from filing lawsuits in the first place ....").
243. OTA, supra note 32, at 24.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 23. There are strong policy reasons why such should not be the case.
While some states have attempted to develop patients' rights legislation, tort refonn
driven by lobbyists and the health care industry focuses on protecting the provider rather
than the victim.
246. Id.
247. Id. It is hard to estimate just how many cases are never brought to the
attention of attorneys. It is believed that as many as seven out of every eight cases of
abuse go unreported. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
248. OTA, supra note 32, at 23.
249. Gail Diane Cox, End of Life Valued, NAT'L L.J., March 2, 1998, at Al.
250.
Id.
251. Id.
252. See supra notes 14-23, 137-43, 249-51 and accompanying text.

638

[Vol. 39: 599, 2002]

California's Elder Abuse Act
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

victims and to society, if not for the moral responsibility that comes
from caring for this unique population, then because of the threat of
effective litigation.253
Critics of MICRA reform quickly point to the cases that comprise
millions of dollars and steal the headlines, garnering criticism from
insurers and nursing homes. 254 Despite the uproar, most elder abuse
cases settle and do not go to trial. Moreover, many of these settle for
less than $50,000, approximately the cost of an annual stay in a nursing
home. 255

1. Institutional Care is Big Business
Another reason that reform is possible is that many of today's nursing
home operators are large corporations rather than private operators.256
MICRA' s limitations and other restrictions placed on the bringing of elder
abuse claims were enacted to protect physicians and small operators from
financial ruin, not huge chains. Arguably, the need to protect large, forprofit corporations from ruin is quite different than protecting mom-andpop nursing homes or those run by nonprofit organizations.257
Ironically, it is the large nursing home corporations that have instead
sought protection under bankruptcy laws for altogether different reasons258
253. See Higgins, supra note 11, at 28-29.
254. Cox, supra note 249, at Al.
255. A review of recent verdicts and settlements also shows plaintiffs rarely get
huge awards from nursing home defendants. See also Webb, supra note 27, at 19 ("In
more than two-thirds of malpractice cases, insurers and researchers say, patients receive
no money. For those people who win malpractice cases, compensation tends to be
relatively meager, according to published reports.").
256. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 83, at 3; Patricia B. Nemore, Nursing
Home Law, in PRACTISING LAW: INSTITUTE TAX LAW AND EsTATE PLANNING COURSE
HANDBOOK SERIES, 196 PLI/Est 93 (WESTLAW), at *93, *95 (1990).
257. In terms of staffing, federal researchers who prepared the Congressional report
on staffing, noted much higher levels in staffing at nonprofit homes versus in those
managed by for-profit corporations. Pear, Concern Over Staffing, supra note 144, at 1.
258. See generally GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 83, at 7-10 (describing
how chains aggressively purchased assets at inflated rates and heavily leveraged
themselves causing "debt-to-equity ratios to spiral precipitously"); Bruce Japsen,
Maryland-Based Nursing Home Chain Files for Bankruptcy Protection, KNIGIIT-RIDDER
TRIB. Bus. NEWS, Feb. 4, 2000, 2000 WL 12902992 (attributing recent chain
banlauptcies to overly aggressive expansion and ignorance of reductions in Medicare
spending required by the Balanced Budget Act of 1997); More Texas Nursing Homes
Face Bankruptcy, BEST'S INS. NEWS, July 7, 2000, 2000 WL 23700747 (quoting industry
sources as suggesting that recent litigation against nursing homes has driven up
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and have cut staff at greater levels to control costs, only to exacerbate the
abuse. 259
2. Proposition 103 May Scrutinize Unfair
Liability Premiums

One underutilized tool of doctors and other health care providers in
the setting of malpractice premium rates is proposition 103.260 Passed in
1988, it allows policyholders and others to challenge an insurer's
ratemaking before California's Insurance Commissioner. 261 If the rates
are found to be unjustified, they are rolled back. 262 In 1975, there was
no such remedy. Regulation of the industry was "de minimis." 263
Insurance companies could set their rates without having to justify them
to the Department of Insurance, their policyholders, or the public.264
MICRA proponents contend proposition 103 will not work to hold
costs down because increasing damage awards increase costs to the
insurance companies. 265 However, doctors have been unwilling to
pursue this avenue altogether, accepting the insurers' rationale and
supporting an all-out attack on plaintiffs, thus attempting to justify
MICRA. 266 Together, they claim great savings under MICRA and
project increased costs they will incur if the cap is lifted. 267
liabilities). But cf Settlement Forces Sale of Nursing Homes, GREENSBORO NEWS &
REC., Feb. 5, 2000, at 28, 2000 WL 5225193 (citing one case where the nursing home
had committed fraud against the government, was fined $175 million in fines, and was
forced to sell homes in California, Georgia, Kansas, South Carolina and Washington).
259. "Several nursing home chains have filed for bankruptcy protection in the
last two years. They include Sun Healthcare, Vencor, Integrated Health Services and
Mariner Post-Acute Network." Pear, Concern Over Staffing, supra note 144, at l.
260. Dresslar, supra note I, at l.
261. Id. Presumably, such a measure would allow doctors to challenge any
computation by insurance companies of potentially excessive malpractice premiums.
262. Id. Despite such a remedy for runaway malpractice premiums, proposition l 03
has been ignored by doctors. Very little reasoning exists as to why this is so, other than
the relationship that the insurance lobby and medical doctors have maintained since the
mid-1970s.
263. Id. During the mid- l 970s crisis, for instance, doctors had to either pay
astronomical increases in their premiums or go without any liability insurance, an option
approximately twenty percent of physicians chose. See supra notes 161-62, 168 and
accompanying text.
264. Id. Today, for the most part, insurance data regarding the effectiveness of
MICRA lies solely within the realm of the insurance companies. See also Norris, supra
note 167, at 51.
265. Dresslar, supra note 1, at l.
266. Id.
267. Id.
However, such data is solely within the possession of insurance
companies.
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3. MICRA Savings Are a Windfall for
Insurance Companies
Such savings created by MICRA, though, have also been a windfall to
the insurance industry. The medical malpractice market is one of the
most lucrative of all.268
According to a California Insurance
Commissioner's study, from 1988 to 1997, the "profit on insurance
transactions for malpractice averaged 24.5 percent of earned premium
income. That compared to the 2.6 percent average for all lines ...." 269
Between 1978 and 1983, insurers earned about $300 million more in
investment income than they paid to victims. 270 The Department of
Insurance reported that "malpractice carriers earned more than $763
million, and paid less than $300 million to claimants" in 1997.271 With
earnings more than twice the amount paid out, it appears that the
industry's threats of increasing malpractice premiums are more than a
little self-serving.
Critics of the insurance industry argue that the market is much more
competitive today than in 1975,272 with only a small percentage of total
medical costs in the United States going to pay malpractice premiums.273
As the argument goes, doctors are already paying higher premiums than
necessary, and these costs only nominally affect health care costs.
Therefore, the system should be capable of absorbing any increases.
4. The Nursing Home Industry Enjoys
Unique Protection
Before EADACPA was enacted, there were very few lawsuits against
nursing homes. The plaintiff had died or would be dead before trial,
thus there was no recovery of general damages. 274 Neither was lost
268. Id. Such a finding would appear counter to concerns expressed by the industry
that it is losing money on malpractice premiums. If true, regardless of whether MICRA
has resulted in any savings for the industry, it would appear that damages may have a
less significant effect on insurance rates than previously advanced.
269. Id.
270. Rosemary Johnston, Medical Malpractice Battle Heats Up Again, SENIOR
HEALTII, reprinted in California Hearings, supra note 155, at 84.
271. Dresslar, supra note 1, at 1.
272. Rosemary Johnston, Medical Malpractice Battle Heats Up Again, SENIOR
HEALTII, reprinted in California Hearings, supra note 155, at 84.
273. In 1983, "less than one half of one percent of the total U.S. costs of medical
care-$355.4 billion-went for malpractice insurance costs." Id.
274. Balisok, supra note 26, at 41.
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wages a viable form of damages since nursing home patients usually are
not employed. And, while damages may have included medical
expenses, some states asserted liens to recoup Medicaid expenses they
paid on behalf of patients. 275 Too often, patients consumed more
resources than they generated.276
Although these same barriers still exist, more attorneys are bringing
nursing home suits such that malpractice premiums are again rising. 277
However, the increase in elder abuse litigation appears to be modest. 278
In response, some insurers have threatened to stop insuring homes, either
because they cannot project their losses or because of unfavorable
political climates. 279
Despite threats of fines and penalties from the Department of Health
Services and rising insurance premiums, nursing homes enjoy unique
protections which allow the homes to continue providing inferior care. 280
Such protections were not available to doctors in 1975. First, the
nursing home can pass off increased insurance premiums as patientrelated expenses under both Medicare and MediCal.281 In fact, more
than ninety-five percent of all nursing homes receive such
reimbursements. 282 On average, it is estimated that eighty percent of a
home's beds are either Medicare or MediCal funded. 283 Thus, eighty
percent of a nursing home's liability premiums will be reimbursed,
including the increased premium. 284 The reimbursement system thus
hinders the deterrent effect increased premiums would otherwise have. 285
Second, in light of bankruptcies and increased insurance rates, some
nursing homes have self-insured themselves, effectively eliminating any
threat of increased premiums. 286

275. Id.
276. The annual cost of a nursing home stay is around $40,000. Higgins, supra
note 11, at 29.
277. Balisok, supra note 26, at 41.
278. The number of claims against nursing homes is increasing by about nine
percent each year. Munz, supra note 148, at Al.
279. Balisok, supra note 26, at 41.
280. Id. at 42.
281. Id.
282. Ronald Lebovits, Calculating Care: New Report Raises Questions About
Nurse Staffing Ratios, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 11, 2000, at 9, WL 9/11/2000 TL! 9.
283. Balisok, supra note 26, at 42.
284. Id. at 42.
285. Id. at 43. Also included in the reimbursement formula under MediCal is the cost
of the nursing home industry association, which also opposes lifting MICRA. Id. at 42.
286. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
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5. Nursing Homes Should Not Be Indemnified
for Reckless Conduct

"[W]e need a change in the law to relieve insurance carriers of
the duty to defend or indemnify nursing homes in actions under
the Elder Abuse Act." 287
"If liability under the Elder Abuse Act were not insurable,
nursing home malpractice insurance would be much less
expensive for the nursing home industry, saving taxpayers
millions of reimbursement dollars." 288

Normally, an insurer must provide a defense to an insured if there is
any potential that the insured's claims are covered. Under section 533 of
the California Insurance Code, an insurer is exempt from this
requirement when confronted with paying punitive damages or any other
damage award based on wilful conduct. 289 As defined, the code does not
exempt insurers from tendering defenses when the conduct is
"reckless."290 Thus, a nursing home can require an insurer defend and
indemnify the home even though its conduct might well fall within
intentional conduct which otherwise would not have been have been
subject to either defense or indemnification.291
6. False Charting Provides Cover-ups

Although DHS sends investigators into nursing homes to conduct site
visits and to investigate complaints, the best source for information
about an event is usually the patient's charts.292 Problems are
complicated when the patient has died or key staff are no longer
employed there.
Often, it is not unlikely to find that charts were falsified to conceal a
bad result, even though such falsification is criminal.293 "Charting
287. Balisok, supra note 26, at 43.
288. Id.
289. CAL. INs. CODE§ 533 (West 1993) ("An insurer is not liable for a loss caused
by the wilful act of the insured; but he is not exonerated by the negligence of the insured,
or of the insured's agents or others.").
290. Balisok, supra note 26, at 43.
291.
Id.
292. Id. at 42.
293. CAL. PEN. CODE§ 471.5 (West 1999) ("Any person who alters or modifies the
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parties," where staff and nurses order in food and stay late to doctor
charts before an inspection, are widely known to occur. 294 In other
instances, charts simply become misplaced, leaving no record at all. 295
IV. CONCLUSION

After twenty-six years with MICRA's $250,000 cap on noneconomic
damages, change is not likely to come soon. Indeed, if any lesson can be
gleaned from previous attempts to overhaul the cap, it is that such a
movement will likely be met with full, head-on attacks by insurers and
nursing homes, all filled with doomsday predictions296 about runaway
costs of health care, lack of physicians willing to accept high-risk
patients such as the elderly, and threats of a return to mid-70s
challenges. 297 The battle lines will once again be drawn between trial
lawyers and health care providers, leaving the most fragile in our society
to the mercies of the legislature.
While MICRA' s policies, particularly in the abstract, are laudable, the
extension of the main provisions to elder abuse cases seems counterintuitive, if not mutually exclusive. On the one hand, MICRA attempts
to discourage litigation, yet the Elder Abuse Act, through sections 15657
and 15657 .2 encourages the bringing of suits. At best, to limit section
15657 by MICRA seems to accomplish nothing but a divided policy in
terms of bringing such a case. Even with the availability of enhanced
remedies, plaintiffs' attorneys must access these by a heightened showing of
clear and convincing evidence. Such a hybrid mix of policies, in the
end, may serve neither side of critics.
To properly frame any worthwhile reform of the issue, it should be
remembered that MICRA was passed in an environment of skyrocketing
malpractice insurance premiums during the mid-70s. Elder abuse was
medical record of any person, with fraudulent intent, or who, with fraudulent intent,
creates any false medical record, is guilty of a misdemeanor.").
294. Balisok, supra note 26, at 42; Gary Kane & Scott Hiaasen, Lax State
Regulation Lets Nursing Homes Sidestep Rules, PALM BEACH POST, Mar. 12, 2001, at IA
(describing how nursing homes prepare for state inspectors by filling in the gaps of
missing records and hiring temporary staff to increase staff-to-patient ratios during
annual inspections).
295. The author is well acquainted with at least one case in which an elderly patient,
who was to be monitored in fifteen minute intervals, died after suffering a fall from her
wheelchair. Despite physician's orders to record all activities and monitoring in the
charts, such records could not be found for the two days preceding her death.
296. Deacon, supra note 60 ("If nursing homes continue to be a prime target for
litigation, the future industry will be threatened, and there will be little left for the frail
and elderly.").
297. See Richardson, supra note 162, at 2.
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not, at the time, considered a problem demanding attention. Today, that
reality is much different.
It was thought, and has been argued by the insurance industry, that
MICRA is crucial to holding down liability premium rates. However,
such data lies solely with the industry. Little objective and empirical
data exists to determine whether MICRA indeed has kept down rates or
if there is some other driving force behind the numbers, such as bad
investments. Even so, these arguments have little meaning in the
nursing home arena.
For starters, nursing homes do not have the same worries about escalating
insurance premiums, as do other health care providers. In fact, eighty
percent of the beds in a typical nursing home are filled with patients
receiving Medicaid or MediCal. Since both programs reimburse homes
for their malpractice premiums, the real payers of these premiums are
not the nursing homes themselves, but taxpayers. Therefore, any
increase in rates is not likely to affect the financial viability of any
nursing home, but rather the amount of the state and federal budget
assigned to this line item.
Many critics, and indeed some federal agencies, have suggested that
the key to our nation's crisis in nursing homes is simply one of staffing.
The argument goes that with more staffing, fewer accidents occur, more
attention can be devoted to each patient, and less stress on an
overworked workforce is created. While the solution seems to make
perfect sense, the sad reality is that nursing homes do not generate huge
profits.298
Many nursing home operators are already in bankruptcy due to
problems other than malpractice suits, and others have entertained the
idea of filing bankruptcy in light of escalating costs that are not directly
reimbursable. Hiring additional staff increases costs, and costs decrease
298. See supra notes 256-59 and accompanying text. But see Higgins, supra note
11, at 29:
Nursing homes typically charge about $40,000 a year. And while some may make
only a small profit on paper, they often pay high salaries to their owneradministrators, according to Nancy Coleman, director of the AB.A. Commission
on Legal Problems of the Elderly. "I've seen lots of people make lots of profit off
Medicaid residents," she says. "Over the last 20 years, these places have been
mints."
Id.; see also Calderone & Zambito, supra note 67, at 28 (citing Florida Health
Department cost reports that found that the 100 for-profit nursing home owners in the
state took home a combined total of $24 million in salary in 1998, with five owners
making a million or more each).
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profits. Faced with this dilemma, many nursing homes simply risk that
they will not be caught. 299 Sadly and empirically, such practices have
become the modus operandi for the industry. Moreover, many states are
experiencing a severe shortage of nursing home workers, and pay is
low. 300 Unless there is additional money to support hiring additional
workers and programs to both promote nursing home careers and
guarantee training capable of delivering quality care, then adequate
staffing may be illusory.
Fines-when they are imposed-are either so low, or are eventually
reduced, so that even with substantial deficiencies, it is much cheaper to
pay the fine than to risk litigating the matter in court. Even more
outrageous, many homes have become nonchalant about the state's
visits, relying on quick fixes instead of truly addressing deficiencies. 301
Others have been able to predict the dates of state inspections. Surely,
this was not the intention of the legislature in enacting EADACPA.
Overhauling EADACPA to strengthen enforcement may take years;
meanwhile, private plaintiffs will be left with a continually shrinking
recovery given inflation and cost of living, and elderly patients must
bear the risks.
Insurance companies should be relieved of the duty to defend in cases
involving claims of reckless neglect under EADACPA. This change
would shift the burden of defense costs and adverse judgments for such
acts to irresponsible nursing home operators. As with any other
defendant who acts with aggravated negligence or intent, it would allow
our judicial system to impose the threat of hard money loss to the
noncompliant operator-something our administrative system has found
hard to do. If litigation becomes more expensive, then perhaps nursing
homes will reconsider their posture and their behavior.
Furthermore, the law should specifically address cover-ups, for
example, falsification of patient records and missing records, by the
facility to hide injuries and bad treatment. Such conduct is reprehensible
and inexcusable. By the time an ombudsman arrives at the facility, there
299.
See GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 23, at 1 (noting that forty percent of
facilities cited often repeat the same violations); Pear, supra note 96, at Al ("Some
nursing homes go in and out of compliance so often that regulations refer to them as
'roller-coaster' or 'yo-yo'homes.").
300. See Hollis, supra note 146, at SB.
301. California's Department of Health Services maintains an open file at each of
its offices for nursing homes in that district showing licensing information, complaints,
and investigations at each facility. In reviewing a sampling of the public files in San
Diego, the author found that steps taken to cure deficiencies cited by DHS investigators
were merely cut and pasted from earlier citations and complaints. Very little effort was
made by the nursing home to address the specific problem.
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is often little more than a paper trail, whose reliability may very well be
in question. This should not be the standard.
Although the plaintiffs' bar has been active in MICRA reform, the
insurance and medical lobbies have been more successful in barring
subsequent amendments to MICRA. With elder abuse, it appears that
the nursing home and nursing home associations are merely echoing the
same concerns from 1975, hoping to enjoy the deep-rooted success of
their counterparts, the doctors and insurers.
If change comes, it must come from the legislature. In less than
twenty years, the elderly population in California will double. One
cannot doubt that such power in the hands of voters will in some way
influence the legislature. But by then it may be too late to fix a system
that will then be entrenched with decades of MICRA protectionism.

MARTIN RAMEY
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